DIPLOMASIA YA TAIFA

Kenya National Foreign Affairs and Integration Vision

Kenya National Development Programme

Umoja ni Nguvu. Ushirikiano ni Ustawi. Afrika ni Nyumba.

Unity is Strength. Cooperation is Prosperity. Africa is Home.

This document establishes Kenya's foreign affairs vision as part of the Kenya National Development Programme. It addresses four interlocking challenges: managing and converting Kenya's debt position from a vulnerability into a diplomatic asset; securing the large-scale infrastructure financing and training collaboration that all programme corps require; accelerating East African integration as a platform for African continental union; and designing a trade architecture that is equitable — protecting the smallest economies from absorption by the largest while creating genuine comparative advantage for every member.

This is not a conventional foreign policy document. It does not merely describe Kenya's bilateral relationships or multilateral commitments. It prescribes the institutional design, the diplomatic doctrine, the financial instruments, and the integration architecture that Kenya will build and advocate for over the next twenty years. Kenya's foreign affairs programme is the connective tissue between every domestic programme document and the world that must finance, partner with, and ultimately receive Kenya's output.

SECTION ONE

The Current Landscape — Honest Assessment

1.1 The Debt Position

Kenya's public debt stands at Ksh 11.8 trillion — 67.8% of GDP as at June 2025. This is 17.8 percentage points above the IMF threshold of 50% for developing countries and carries a high risk of debt distress designation from the IMF and World Bank. The debt service-to-revenue ratio stands at 67.1% — meaning for every Ksh 100 Kenya collects in revenue, Ksh 67 goes to debt service before a single road is repaired, a single teacher paid, or a single medicine purchased. The external debt component of Ksh 5.5 trillion is 62% denominated in USD, creating significant exchange rate exposure that compounds the burden every time the shilling weakens.

This is the reality that the foreign affairs vision must confront. It cannot be managed through denial or through optimistic GDP projections that assume the problem solves itself. The fiscal consolidation path — reducing the deficit from 5.6% to 4.3% of GDP — is necessary but insufficient. What is required is a qualitative transformation of what Kenya borrows for, from whom, on what terms, and what the borrowed capital produces. The KNDP is that transformation. Every infrastructure investment in the programme is designed to generate fiscal returns — PAYE from 200,000–250,000 new permanent positions, corporate taxes from KISC and KFPEC production, freight revenues from the KRC network, agricultural levy income from the cooperative surplus chain. The debt must become the seed of the revenue that retires it.

The Core Doctrine: Debt as Infrastructure, Infrastructure as Revenue

Kenya does not borrow to consume. Kenya borrows to build institutions that generate fiscal returns greater than the cost of the debt. Every ksh of debt incurred under this programme is matched to a specific institution, a specific employment figure, a specific revenue stream, and a specific retirement timeline.

The Kenya Railway Corps costs $12.6B. It generates freight revenue from Year 6 that covers debt service from Year 8. The KRC is not a burden. It is a long-term fiscal asset.

The KISC integrated mill costs USD 1.8B (Ksh 240B). It displaces approximately Ksh 105B per year of steel imports from Year 8. The mill is not expenditure. It is import substitution at scale.

This doctrine — debt as infrastructure, infrastructure as revenue — is the argument Kenya makes to every bilateral creditor, every DFI, every sovereign wealth fund, and every bond market. It is not an aspiration. It is a covenant backed by specific investment designs and enforceable through the NDFICO portfolio management architecture.

1.2 The Bilateral and Multilateral Landscape

Kenya's current external debt creditor profile reflects the architecture of the previous generation of infrastructure financing — a dependence on bilateral commercial terms that has proven expensive and on sovereign debt instruments that carry currency risk. The programme requires a different architecture for each major investment class.

Creditor/Partner Category	Current Position and Programme Requirement
China — EXIM Bank, China Development Bank	Current: The SGR loan from Chinese EXIM at commercial rates (approximately 3.5–5% over LIBOR) accounts for a significant portion of external debt stress. The terms — including an operational management role for CRBC — represent the architecture this programme explicitly rejects. Programme requirement: Chinese EXIM remains a necessary partner for the KRC Atlas ($5.0B, 40% of the $12.6B structure) but ONLY on terms consistent with the Energy Sector Sovereign Protection Act model: Kenyan governing law, no operational control, automatic reversion, full transparency. The no-operational-control clause is in statute, not in the contract. The KRC Corps Act makes it non-negotiable before any negotiator walks into a room.
Gulf Sovereign Wealth Funds — Saudi PIF, UAE ADQ, Qatar QIA	Current: Minimal. Some FDI in real estate and agriculture. No infrastructure partnership. Programme requirement: Gulf SWF co-investment is the $2.5B (20%) tranche of the KRC financing structure. The Gulf states are seeking long-term logistics equity — the Lamu Port connects directly to Gulf maritime trade routes. The Isiolo Inland Depot is an EAC-scale logistics hub that generates long-term returns. Kenya's relationship with the Gulf must be repositioned from remittance dependence (critical but passive) to infrastructure co-investment (active and strategic).
World Bank and IMF	Current: Active. Kenya has IDA access. The IMF has a programme (Extended Fund Facility) providing balance of payments support. The relationship carries conditionalities that have at times constrained fiscal space. Programme requirement: The KNDP's fiscal consolidation trajectory — deficit reduction from 5.6% to 4.3% of GDP — is consistent with the IMF programme. The World Bank is a co-financier for NHB (Ksh 30B AfDB + WB tranche), ADBK recapitalisation, school infrastructure, and water tower restoration. The programme does not reject IFI engagement — it insists on co-investment terms rather than conditionality-only terms. Kenya brings a coherent national programme, not a project list.
African Development Bank	Current: Active partner across multiple sectors. Kenya has solid credit standing with AfDB. Programme requirement: AfDB is the anchor partner for geothermal (40%), HVDC grid (40%), NHB (30B tranche), ADBK recapitalisation, school infrastructure, and water programme. AfDB's Green Climate Fund and climate adaptation windows are relevant for the Mazingira programme. Kenya's ambition is to become AfDB's

Creditor/Partner Category	Current Position and Programme Requirement
	largest single-country programme client — not through volume but through the coherence and bankability of the KNDP portfolio. NDFICO manages the entire AfDB relationship as a single portfolio.
European Investment Bank and bilateral Europe	Current: EIB active in energy and climate. Germany KfW active in water and sanitation. France AFD active in urban. Programme requirement: EIB as co-financier for HVDC (30%) and geothermal. Germany as primary bilateral partner for the Settlement Maintenance Corps Academy model (Germany's KfW expertise in municipal infrastructure maintenance is the closest global analogue). France as partner for the KRC Training Command (SNCF partnership for railway operational training). Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland) for water tower restoration (primarily grant-funded).
Japan — JICA	Current: Active in infrastructure including Nairobi Expressway and health. Programme requirement: JICA as co-financier for HVDC (20%). JICA's railway expertise (Shinkansen programme, African railway development) makes it a natural partner for KRC Training Command. Japan's manufacturing expertise is the alternative or complement to the Korean/German technology partner for KISC.
United States — DFC, USAID, MCC	Current: MCC Compact historically focused on land and energy. DFC emerging. USAID active in health and agriculture. Programme requirement: US-Kenya relationship is at an inflection point. The DFC's infrastructure mandate makes it a potential partner for KFPEC manufacturing and the SEZ programme. AGOA renewal or replacement is critical for Kenya's textile and manufacturing exports. The KNAC programme has a natural partnership with USAID global health programmes. The relationship with the US requires a more strategic positioning — Kenya is the United States' most important partner in East Africa and should negotiate accordingly.
Korea and Germany — industrial partners for KISC	Current: Minimal direct role in Kenya's industrial base. Programme requirement: The KISC integrated steel mill requires a 25% strategic industrial partner providing technology licence and operational management transition. This partner is a Korean or German integrated steel producer. The selection is a diplomatic and commercial decision of the highest order — Korea (POSCO model) or Germany (ThyssenKrupp model) brings different technology trajectories, different green steel retrofit pathways, and different training collaboration terms. The choice is made by NDFICO and Cabinet following a competitive process.

1.3 The Regional Landscape — East Africa

The EAC has grown from three Partner States in 1999 to eight in 2024 — Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, DRC, and Somalia — covering over 300 million people. It has achieved genuine milestones: the Common Market Protocol, the Single Customs Territory, the One Network Area eliminating roaming charges, the East African Electronic Passport, and most recently a trade surplus in Q1 2025. But the structural constraints are severe. Intra-EAC trade represents only 15–20% of member states' total trade, compared to the EU's 60–70% internal ratio. Transport costs average $0.17–0.25 per ton-kilometre — nearly triple the $0.06–0.09 in developed regions. Railway freight carries only 8% of regional cargo volume; the target is 25% by 2030. The rules of origin for key sectors remain unresolved. The Monetary Union Protocol is signed but not implemented.

Kenya is currently the Chair of the EAC (from November 2024 for one year) and simultaneously holds the COMESA chairmanship. This is the highest concentration of regional institutional leadership Kenya has ever held. The KNDP uses this window — not to extract concessions, but to architect the next generation of EAC integration around infrastructure that Kenya is building anyway. The KRC network is not a Kenya project that happens to cross borders. It is an East African project that Kenya is building because it must, and which will transform the region because of its scale.

1.4 The Continental Landscape — AfCFTA

The African Continental Free Trade Area has been signed by 54 of 55 AU member states and ratified by 49. Intra-African trade reached $192 billion in 2023 — approximately 15% of total African trade. The EU's equivalent figure is 60–70%. The gap is not a mystery: it reflects infrastructure costs, border friction, non-tariff barriers, and the absence of a Pan-African payment system at scale. The PAPSS (Pan-African Payment and Settlement System) is operational and growing — 15 central banks, 12 payment switches, 50+ commercial banks. The AfCFTA Phase II Protocols on Investment, Intellectual Property, Competition, Digital Trade, and Women and Youth in Trade were adopted in 2023–2024 and await ratification. Rules of origin remain the critical unresolved technical issue — particularly for textiles and automotive.

The AfCFTA is also the institutional home for the long-term ambition that this document takes seriously: the continental economic union. The Agenda 2063 vision of 'An Integrated, Prosperous and Peaceful Africa' is not aspirational language — it is the stated objective of the AU framework that 54 governments have signed. The question is not whether, but how, at what pace, and through what institutional architecture. This document proposes that Kenya lead the answer.

SECTION TWO

The Diplomatic Doctrine

2.1 Four Principles

Principle One: Sovereign Terms First, Finance Second

Kenya does not begin financing negotiations for any project above Ksh 500M without first establishing the non-negotiable sovereign terms that any financing arrangement must meet. These terms mirror the Energy Sector Sovereign Protection Act: Kenyan governing law, Kenyan dispute resolution, no operational control, automatic reversion of assets, full transparency of terms.

The negotiating posture is: 'Here is the project. Here are the terms on which we will accept financing. If you cannot accept these terms, we will find a partner who can.' This posture is only credible if Kenya has a coherent programme that multiple partners want access to. The KNDP creates that credibility.

Principle Two: Portfolio Diplomacy, Not Project Diplomacy

Kenya does not send individual ministries to negotiate individual projects with individual partners. NDFICO manages Kenya's entire DFI relationship as a single portfolio — 50 projects, 10 active, 20 advanced, 20 early — and presents this portfolio to each partner as a menu, not a single transaction.

A bilateral partner who wants access to the KRC freight revenue stream also sees the KISC industrial opportunity, the NHB diaspora bond, and the agricultural cooperative export platform. Kenya's diplomacy is bundled. The price of entry to one opportunity is alignment with the sovereign terms framework across all.

Principle Three: Regional Co-Construction, Not National Extraction

Kenya does not build infrastructure that happens to cross borders. Kenya designs infrastructure as regional from Day 1. Every KRC corridor is designed with the partner country's transport ministry. Every Isiolo Inland Depot logistics plan is designed with landlocked partners. Every KWCMC cross-border water scheme is co-designed with Ethiopia, Uganda, and Tanzania.

Regional co-construction has two practical effects: it multiplies the financing base (landlocked countries' transit revenues support the financing case), and it creates political constituencies in partner countries that protect the infrastructure from unilateral reversal.

Principle Four: Integration as Infrastructure, Not Integration as Negotiation

The EU's integration did not succeed because of treaty language. It succeeded because Germany and France built institutions together that neither could undo without catastrophic cost. The integration Kenya advocates is built the same way:

physical infrastructure that is most valuable when connected, digital systems that are most functional when shared, financial institutions that are most resilient when continental.

Kenya does not advocate for African integration by making speeches at AU summits. Kenya advocates for African integration by building the railway, the power grid, the payment system, and the digital backbone that make integration economically inevitable.

2.2 The Diplomatic Institutions

Institution	Design and Mandate
Ministry of Foreign Affairs — reformed	The MFA is redesigned around three directorates: the Economic Diplomacy Directorate (manages all bilateral and multilateral relationships that have a programme financing or trade dimension — works in daily coordination with NDFICO); the Political and Security Directorate (peace and stability, EAC conflict resolution, AU representation, UN Security Council engagement); and the Integration Directorate (EAC, COMESA, AfCFTA, and the continental union architecture). The Cabinet Secretary for Foreign Affairs chairs a monthly Diplomatic Investment Committee with the CS Treasury, the NDFICO Director, the KRC Corps Commander, and the KECA Director-General.
NDFICO — National Development Finance and Investment Coordination Office	The operational arm of economic diplomacy. 30 professionals. Manages the entire DFI portfolio as a single book. Every bilateral and multilateral financing conversation above Ksh 1B is channelled through NDFICO. NDFICO's counterpart at the IMF is the IMF Resident Representative. Its counterpart at the World Bank is the Country Director. Its counterpart at AfDB is the Country Manager. NDFICO Director is a Cabinet-level appointment, 6-year Parliamentary-confirmed term, market-rate compensation. NDFICO publishes an annual Kenya DFI Portfolio Report — every facility, every term, every drawdown — within 60 days of the financial year end. Transparency is the instrument.
Kenya Export and Investment Promotion Authority — reformed KEPROBA	KEPROBA is restructured as Kenya's single export promotion and investment attraction institution. Its mandate: promote Kenya-made goods in AfCFTA markets (starting with the Guided Trade Initiative successor programme); attract industrial FDI for the KISC supply chain and the SEZ clusters; manage the Kenya Export Mark and Kenya Coffee Brand international registration; and coordinate the trade attaches in every Kenyan mission abroad. KEPROBA publishes quarterly sector export performance data. Every Kenyan mission abroad has a designated Economic Officer reporting to KEPROBA.
Kenya Regional Integration Office — new	A small (20-person) unit in the MFA that specifically manages Kenya's engagement with EAC, COMESA, AU, and the

Institution	Design and Mandate
	continental union architecture. It provides the policy secretariat for Kenya's contributions to EAC legislation, the AfCFTA Goods and Services Committees, the AU Agenda 2063 implementation framework, and the proposed East African Political Confederation. The Director is a career diplomat with deep technical expertise in trade law and integration architecture.
Training and Technical Cooperation Agency — new	Kenya's instrument for exporting the expertise generated by the KNDP to partner countries. The KRCC Academy trains EAC partner country road construction teams. The KNAC Training Institute trains EAC ambulance corps personnel. The KAERS regional demonstration farms host EAC extension officers for annual training rotations. This is not aid. It is technical cooperation that builds the human capital base for regional integration and generates goodwill that is durable and specific.

SECTION THREE

The East African Integration Programme

3.1 The Eastern Africa Standard Gauge Railway — A Nine-Country Project

The KRC Atlas covers 4,572km of Kenya's territory. But the railway's economic logic is regional from the first metre of track. The Mombasa port is the entry point for landlocked Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, DRC (eastern), and Ethiopia. The LAPSSET Northern Spine connects to Ethiopia's Hawassa Industrial Park and Addis Ababa. The Lateral Spine at Malaba is Uganda's standard gauge connection. The Tanzania crossing at Isibania connects to TAZARA. Every corridor in the Atlas has a partner country at its terminus. The KRC is not a Kenyan railway. It is the East African railway that Kenya is building.

The diplomatic proposal: transform the KRC Atlas into the Eastern Africa Standard Gauge Railway (EASGR) — a nine-country jointly-owned infrastructure corporation modelled on the East African Railways Corporation that existed before 1977. Kenya contributes the $12.6B investment and the 4,572km of track. Partner countries contribute the connecting corridors and the transit revenue agreements. The EASGR Board is constituted by EAC member states on a weighted basis. The financing structure — Chinese EXIM, Gulf SWF, AfDB/WB — is regionalised so that landlocked countries access DFI financing for their connecting corridors through the same instruments Kenya uses, at the same terms.

EASGR Component	Partner Country and Design
Kenya — KRC Atlas 4,572km	The trunk network. Southern Spine (Mombasa–Kisumu–Nairobi–Isibania), Lateral Spine (Malaba–Eldoret–Isiolo), LAPSSET (Nairobi–Isiolo–Garissa–Lamu), Phase 3 ASAL corridors. Financed through the KRC architecture. Already in planning and legislation.
Uganda — Kampala–Malaba Standard Gauge	Uganda's section connecting Kampala to the Malaba junction on the Kenya Lateral Spine. Uganda's existing metric-gauge network to be upgraded in parallel. DFI financing through the EASGR regional facility at the same blended 3.8% rate Kenya achieves through portfolio diplomacy.
Tanzania — Dar es Salaam–Isibania Standard Gauge	Tanzania's SGR programme already underway (Dar–Mwanza section). Extension to Isibania connects to Kenya's Southern Spine. Creates a Dar es Salaam–Mombasa dual-port competitive system that benefits the entire region's exporters through competition and redundancy.
Rwanda — Kigali–Uganda connection	Rwanda's rail access through Uganda (Kigali–Kampala corridor). Rwanda is landlocked; rail access is a sovereignty and economic security issue. Rwanda's participation in EASGR financing is calibrated to its GDP — smaller contribution, proportional governance rights, full access to the through-corridor.

EASGR Component	Partner Country and Design
Burundi — Bujumbura–Rwanda connection	Burundi's connection through Rwanda. The DRC conflict dynamics make Burundi's eastern corridor diplomatically complex — the EASGR architecture creates a development interest in stability that is more durable than any peace agreement.
DRC — Kivu–Uganda Eastern Corridor	DRC's mineral wealth — Katanga copper, Kivu rare earths — needs a viable export corridor. The eastern DRC corridor through Uganda to Mombasa is shorter than the current Dar es Salaam route. DRC's participation in EASGR is the programme's most geopolitically significant element — it creates an economic stake in the region's stability for Africa's largest country by area.
South Sudan — Juba–Uganda connection	South Sudan's connection through Uganda. South Sudan's oil revenues are the natural financing instrument for its EASGR contribution. The design recognises that South Sudan's participation is contingent on political stability — the EASGR architecture is designed to be attractive enough that South Sudan's leadership views rail connection as worth preserving peace for.
Ethiopia — Addis Ababa–Isiolo connection	Ethiopia's connection from Addis Ababa south to the Kenya border at Moyale and then to Isiolo via the LAPSSET Northern Spine. Ethiopia has the largest population in Africa (120M+). An Ethiopia–Mombasa rail corridor is transformative for regional trade. Ethiopia's industrial parks (Hawassa, Bole Lemi) need reliable export infrastructure. Kenya needs Ethiopia's market.
Somalia — Mogadishu–Garissa–Lamu coastal connection	Somalia's connection from Mogadishu southwest to the Kenya border and then to Garissa, connecting to the LAPSSET line and Lamu Port. Somalia's EAC membership (full from March 2024) creates a legal framework for this connection. The coastal route also serves Kenya's northern counties that currently lack rail access.

3.2 The East African Energy Architecture — Shared Surplus, Not Competition

The previous version of this section described Kenya's 4,000 MW surplus as an export. That framing is wrong — and this section corrects it. Kenya is not the only East African country with surplus generation. Ethiopia's Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) has 6,450 MW installed capacity and a declared export ambition — Ethiopia already exports power to Djibouti and Sudan and is building transmission to South Sudan. Uganda's Karuma (600 MW) and Isimba (183 MW) dams give Uganda a modest surplus. The correct energy architecture for East Africa is not a competition between surplus generators for captive markets — it is a jointly managed regional grid in which every surplus flows to every deficit, and in which investment in new generation is coordinated at the regional level so that no country builds capacity the region does not need.

The East African Power Pool (EAPP) already exists as an institution — founded in 2005, headquartered in Addis Ababa, with Kenya, Ethiopia, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, Sudan, Libya, and Egypt as members. What it lacks is the transmission infrastructure, the harmonised grid codes, the cross-border power trading agreements, and the dispute resolution mechanism to function as a real pool rather than a diplomatic aspiration. Kenya's KNDP is building the transmission infrastructure on the Kenyan side. The diplomatic programme is to build the same on every other side simultaneously.

The Collaborative Surplus Doctrine

Ethiopia's GERD surplus + Uganda's Karuma surplus + Kenya's geothermal and solar surplus = a combined East African generation surplus that is large enough to electrify the entire EAC deficit and begin exporting to Central Africa (DRC, South Sudan) and the Horn.

The doctrine: no East African country prices its power surplus to undercut another's. Ethiopia does not price GERD power to compete with Kenya's geothermal. Kenya does not build capacity to displace Ethiopian exports to Djibouti. The pricing is harmonised through the EAPP Pool Price — set by the EAPP Secretariat on a cost-plus-return formula — so that the pool's combined surplus reaches deficit countries at the lowest blended cost, drawing from whichever surplus is geographically closest and technically most reliable.

The transmission infrastructure: Kenya's HVDC backbone connects to Ethiopia's grid at Moyale (on the LAPSSET corridor's natural right-of-way). Kenya's western grid connects to Uganda at Malaba (on the EASGR Lateral Spine right-of-way). Tanzania's southern grid connects to Kenya at the Southern Spine terminus. One right-of-way. Three power interconnections. The railway and the grid travel together.

EAC Country	Energy Position and Regional Role
Ethiopia	Generation surplus: GERD 6,450 MW + other hydro. Export markets: Djibouti (active), Sudan (active), South Sudan (planned), Kenya (planned via Moyale interconnection). Ethiopia's role in the pool: the largest single supplier. Kenya's diplomatic position: we do not build geothermal capacity to compete with GERD — we build it to serve our own demand and contribute to the pool's reliability. Kenya's geothermal is baseload (constant output regardless of season). Ethiopia's hydro is seasonal (output varies with rainfall). The two are complementary, not competitive. Kenya proposes a bilateral Baseload-Hydro Complementarity Agreement with Ethiopia — Kenya's geothermal backstops Ethiopia's dry-season hydro deficit; Ethiopia's hydro surplus backs Kenya's geothermal maintenance windows.
Uganda	Generation surplus: Karuma 600 MW + Isimba 183 MW. Uganda's domestic demand is approximately 700–800 MW. Uganda has a genuine export surplus. Uganda's role in the pool: the western node, connecting to Rwanda and DRC. Kenya connects to Uganda at Malaba; Uganda connects to Rwanda at Gatuna. The ring is complete. Kenya's diplomatic position: Uganda's surplus is the pool's

EAC Country	Energy Position and Regional Role
	western anchor. Kenya does not build transmission capacity that would route Uganda's natural Rwanda customers through Kenya — the pool's routing protocol sends each unit of power via the shortest technically viable path.
Tanzania	Generation: Mwalimu Nyerere Dam (2,115 MW, under construction). Tanzania is transitioning from deficit to surplus. Tanzania's connection to Kenya at Isibania (Southern Spine EASGR corridor) is the pool's southern link. Tanzania's Rufiji hydro and Kenya's geothermal are similarly complementary — seasonal hydro and constant baseload. Tanzania's connection also links to Zambia and SADC's SAPP (Southern African Power Pool), creating an EAPP-SAPP bridge.
Rwanda and Burundi	Combined demand approximately 600 MW. Current deficits covered by expensive diesel and small hydro. Uganda's surplus and Ethiopia's GERD export are the natural suppliers — through the pool routing protocol, not bilateral agreements that create dependency on a single supplier. Rwanda's geothermal potential (Virunga volcanic zone) is underdeveloped — Kenya offers KAERS and GDC technical partnership to assess and develop Rwanda's geothermal, reducing Rwanda's long-term import dependence.
DRC	DRC's Inga hydro potential is the largest in the world — 40,000 MW estimated at Grand Inga, of which only 1,775 MW (Inga 1 and 2) are operational. DRC is simultaneously the region's greatest energy deficit and the region's greatest energy potential. Kenya's diplomatic position: support for the Grand Inga 3 development (4,800 MW Phase 1) through the AIIB and AfDB as the primary financing instruments, with EAPP's pool architecture ready to absorb and distribute Inga 3's output. DRC's energy development transforms the continental balance — it ends African energy scarcity if the transmission infrastructure is built.
South Sudan and Somalia	Both in significant deficit with minimal generation capacity. Both are the pool's humanitarian priority — electrification is the foundation of every other development outcome. The pool's priority allocation: South Sudan and Somalia receive first claim on EAC surplus at the minimum cost-of-transmission price. Development finance covers the transmission cost subsidy. This is not charity — it is the recognition that a stable, electrified South Sudan and Somalia are worth more to the EAC's collective security and market growth than the marginal revenue from selling that power at market rates.

3.3 East African Tourism — Collaborative Circuit, Not Competitive Pitch

Every East African country currently sells itself to the global tourism market as a standalone destination. Kenya pitches the Maasai Mara. Tanzania pitches Serengeti and Kilimanjaro. Rwanda pitches gorillas. Uganda pitches chimpanzees. Ethiopia pitches Lalibela and the Danakil. The result: a tourist flying from London or New York to East Africa visits one country, perhaps two, and leaves. The region captures

one ticket, one hotel revenue stream, one park fee. The collaborative circuit captures everything.

The case for collaborative circuit tourism is compelling at every level. A visitor who starts in Nairobi, takes the EASGR to Mombasa for coastal heritage, crosses to Zanzibar by ferry, drives to the Serengeti, crosses to Rwanda for gorillas, flies to Uganda for chimpanzees and source-of-the-Nile, and returns via Addis Ababa for Lalibela and the Danakil Depression — that visitor spends 21 days in East Africa instead of 7, generates revenue for six countries instead of one, and returns home with a story about Africa rather than a story about Kenya or Tanzania. The competition for that visitor's week between Kenya and Tanzania is replaced by cooperation for that visitor's three weeks between all six countries.

The East African Tourism Circuit — Design Principles

SINGLE VISA: One visa for the EAC circuit — valid for all eight member states, purchased online before arrival, priced competitively against South Africa's single-country visa. The East African Tourist Visa already exists in partial form (Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda). Full EAC extension is the diplomatic ask.

SEAMLESS MOVEMENT: EASGR passenger services connect the circuit's nodes. The Mombasa–Nairobi–Kisumu–Kampala–Kigali corridor is a single tourist route. The Nairobi–Isiolo–Ethiopia border connection opens the Rift Valley–Danakil circuit. Tanzania's northern circuit connects via Southern Spine. The tourist does not experience borders — they experience landscapes.

JOINT MARKETING: The East African Tourism Board — not Kenya Tourism Board, not Tanzania Tourism Board — markets the circuit globally as a single product. Budget: pooled at 0.5% of each member state's tourism revenue, managed by the EAC Secretariat's Tourism Directorate. The marketing message: East Africa is the world's greatest nature and heritage circuit. Not the world's greatest Kenyan safari.

COMPLEMENTARY POSITIONING: Kenya's strength is savanna and Maasai heritage. Tanzania's is Kilimanjaro, Serengeti, and Zanzibar coast. Rwanda's is gorillas and genocide reconciliation heritage (a powerful and growing tourism category). Uganda's is primates, source of the Nile, and Albertine Rift. Ethiopia's is ancient Christian heritage, Danakil extremes, and Omo Valley cultural diversity. Somalia's is pristine Indian Ocean coast (longest in Africa) — underdeveloped for tourism but potentially transformative once security improves. DRC's is Virunga (gorillas and active volcanoes). No country's product competes with another's. The circuit is designed so that seeing one makes you want to see all.

REVENUE SHARING: Park fees within the circuit are split: 60% to the host country's conservation fund, 20% to the EAC Transboundary Conservation Fund (managing cross-border ecosystems like the Serengeti-Mara), 20% to host communities adjacent to the park. The Transboundary Conservation Fund is the mechanism that prevents one country's poaching from undermining another country's tourism product.

3.4 Mineral Resources — Collaborative Governance, Not Competitive Extraction

East Africa's mineral endowment is extraordinary and underused. Kenya has Mrima Hill rare earths and niobium. Ethiopia has potash (one of the world's largest deposits), gold, and tantalite. Uganda has cobalt, gold, and oil. Tanzania has gold (third largest African producer), diamonds (Williamson), tanzanite (only deposit on Earth), and extensive natural gas. DRC has coltan (60%+ of world reserves), cobalt (70%+ of world reserves), diamonds, gold, cassiterite, and copper — the mineral foundation of every electric vehicle battery, every smartphone, and every renewable energy system on the planet. Rwanda has coltan, cassiterite, and wolfram.

The current model: every country extracts, every country sells individually, every country competes on price with every other. The result: global commodity buyers play East African countries against each other, suppressing prices, extracting rents, and leaving environmental costs as national liabilities. DRC's coltan and cobalt — critical minerals for the global energy transition — are sold at a fraction of their value because DRC negotiates alone against global mining majors who negotiate collectively.

Collaborative Minerals Architecture Component	Design
East African Minerals Intelligence Unit (EAMIU)	A joint technical body — 5 professionals from each EAC member state — that maintains a comprehensive database of East Africa's mineral endowment, production volumes, price benchmarks, royalty rates, and environmental performance data. The EAMIU publishes quarterly reports. Its data is the shared intelligence basis for every member state's mineral negotiation. No more information asymmetry between a global mining major and an individual African government — the EAMIU gives every government access to the same data the majors have.
EAC Consolidated Minerals Negotiating Unit (CMNU)	For critical minerals with continental strategic significance — rare earths (Kenya's Mrima Hill), cobalt and coltan (DRC), lithium (potential deposits across the region), tantalum (Rwanda and DRC) — EAC member states negotiate offtake agreements collectively rather than individually. A Korean battery manufacturer seeking cobalt supply negotiates with the CMNU rather than with the DRC alone. The CMNU's negotiating position: we represent 70%+ of the world's cobalt and a significant share of the global rare earth endowment. Our terms are non-negotiable on: beneficiation requirements (minimum processing before export), governing law, dispute resolution, environmental standards, and community royalty shares.
EAC Minerals Training Institute (EAMTI)	A joint training institution — jointly funded, jointly staffed — that trains East Africa's mining engineers, geological surveyors, environmental monitors, mine safety officers, regulatory inspectors, and community liaison officers to a shared regional standard. Located at three sites: Nairobi (Kenya's KNAGS partnership), Dar es Salaam (Tanzania's gold industry expertise), and Lubumbashi (DRC's copper belt

Collaborative Minerals Architecture Component	Design
	expertise). The EAMTI graduates are certified by the EAC — their qualification is recognised across all eight member states. A Rwandan mining engineer trained at EAMTI can work in any EAC member state's mining sector.
EAC Transboundary Minerals Royalty Fund	A portion (10%) of each EAC member state's mineral royalty revenue is pooled into the EAC Transboundary Minerals Royalty Fund. The Fund finances: regional geological survey (extending Kenya's KNAGS airborne survey methodology across all EAC territories), environmental remediation of legacy mining sites, community development in mining-affected areas that cross borders, and the EAMTI's operating budget. The Fund is governed by an EAC board with equal representation from all member states regardless of contribution — a deliberate equity mechanism that ensures DRC's large contribution does not give it disproportionate control.
Beneficiation mandate across the EAC	All EAC member states commit to a common beneficiation schedule: by Year 5, no unprocessed ore leaves the EAC without a beneficiation exemption (granted by the CMNU only when processing capacity does not yet exist); by Year 10, all mineral exports are at minimum concentrate grade; by Year 15, the EAC produces refined metals for at least 50% of its mineral endowment. Kenya's KISC provides the steel for the mining equipment. Rwanda's and DRC's mineral processing plants are KFPEC clients. The industrial and mineral programmes are explicitly linked.
EAC Environmental Enforcement Protocol	Mining environmental standards are enforced at the EAC level, not just the national level. A mining operation in DRC that pollutes the Congo River basin creates downstream costs in every country the river touches. The EAC Environmental Enforcement Protocol gives the EAPP's successor body (the EAC Environmental Authority) standing to bring enforcement actions against mining operations that generate cross-border environmental harm — regardless of the host country's domestic position.

3.5 The EAC Niche Trade Architecture — Protecting Small Economies

Every EAC economy has comparative advantages that free trade can amplify rather than eliminate, provided the trade architecture is designed around those advantages rather than forcing every country to compete on the same products. The instrument is the EAC Niche Product Register.

The EAC Niche Product Register — Principle and Design

The EAC Niche Product Register is a list of products, agricultural commodities, cultural goods, and services where a specific EAC member state has a designated regional comparative advantage. Products on the Register receive: preferential shelf access at major EAC retail chains and government procurement; a regional quality certification mark ('East African Origin') that commands premium pricing in international markets; joint regional marketing investment through EAC trade promotion budgets; and development finance priority through the EASGR freight capacity allocation system.

Registration criteria: the product is produced primarily or exclusively in that country, has distinctive quality characteristics linked to its origin (climate, soil, artisanal process, heritage), and cannot be replicated at lower cost by a larger EAC economy without sacrificing the distinctive quality characteristics.

Examples: Rwanda's single-origin arabica coffee and Gahwa heritage tea. Burundi's organic green tea and hand-woven imigongo baskets. Uganda's robusta coffee and vanilla. South Sudan's sorghum and millet heritage varieties. Tanzania's Zanzibar spices, Kilimanjaro coffee, and semi-precious gemstones. Somalia's camel milk products and Indian Ocean dried fish. DRC's sustainably harvested forest products and artisanal heritage crafts. Ethiopia's Yirgacheffe and Sidama coffee (the world's original arabica), its tej honey wine, and its hand-woven Habesha textiles.

Kenya's role: Kenya is the large economy in this architecture. Kenya's comparative advantage is the manufacturing, logistics, and processing that makes everyone else's niche products more valuable. Kenya processes Rwanda's coffee at the Nairobi Coffee Roasting Park but sells it as 'Rwanda Single Origin Roasted in Nairobi' — the origin certification belongs to Rwanda, the value addition belongs to Kenya, the market access is shared.

The EAC's One Network Area has already eliminated roaming charges across most partner states. The next step — the East African Digital Single Market — requires: a common digital identity framework interoperable across all eight member states; a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System fully integrated across all EAC central banks; a shared government cloud architecture (Kenya's Wingu la Taifa as the regional data centre anchor); harmonised data protection legislation based on a common framework; and mutual recognition of digital signatures and electronic documents.

3.6 The East African Digital Single Market

The EAC's One Network Area has already eliminated roaming charges across most partner states. The next step — the East African Digital Single Market — requires: a common digital identity framework interoperable across all eight member states; a Pan-African Payment and Settlement System fully integrated across all EAC central banks; a shared government cloud architecture (Kenya's Wingu la Taifa as the regional data centre anchor); harmonised data protection legislation based on a common framework; and mutual recognition of digital signatures and electronic documents.

Kenya's contribution: Wingu la Taifa's physical infrastructure is the regional data centre. Kenya's ArdhiSasa land registry model is offered as the EAC land registration standard. Kenya's eCitizen platform is open-sourced for partner country adoption.

The Kenya Digital Infrastructure Company operates the physical backbone; the EAC Digital Single Market Secretariat operates the interoperability layer.

EAC Digital Market Component	Kenya's Role
Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS)	Kenya's Central Bank is one of the 15 founding central banks of PAPSS. Full commercial bank integration within Year 2 — every bank account in Kenya connected to the continental payment system. PAPSS eliminates the USD correspondent banking cost that currently adds 3–7% to every intra-African transaction.
EAC Common Digital Identity	Kenya's Huduma Namba — connected to the KNQF verification API, the NHB loan system, and NIAS — is interoperable from Day 1 with the EAC Common Digital Identity framework. A Kenyan working in Uganda uses their Kenyan digital identity for banking, health, and social protection across the region.
EAC E-Government Standards	Kenya's eCitizen architecture — built on open standards — is offered to EAC partner countries as a deployable template. Rwanda, Uganda, Tanzania, and Somalia reduce e-government development costs by adapting Kenya's open-source codebase rather than building from scratch.
EAC Cybersecurity Framework	Kenya's NIS cyber operations and Government Cloud Security Cell are the most developed in East Africa. Kenya leads the EAC Cybersecurity Framework — common standards, a regional cyber incident response protocol, and joint team training.
EAMIU Digital Platform	The East African Minerals Intelligence Unit's data platform — mineral endowment mapping, production volumes, price benchmarks, environmental monitoring — is hosted on Wingu la Taifa and accessible to all EAMIU member state governments in real time.
EAPP Grid Management System	The East African Power Pool's real-time grid balancing and cross-border trading platform is hosted on the EAC Digital Market. Surplus generation in Ethiopia's GERD is offered to DRC and South Sudan within minutes through the automated pool pricing mechanism.

SECTION FOUR

The Pan-African Federal Union — Architecture and Pathway

4.1 The Vision

The African Union's Agenda 2063 envisions 'An integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa' with a Continental Free Trade Area, a Continental Customs Union, a common African passport, a single aviation market, a Pan-African digital single market, and ultimately an African political union. This is not new. Pan-Africanism is as old as the independence movements. What is new is that for the first time, the institutional building blocks — the AfCFTA, the PAPSS, the Yamoussoukro Decision on aviation, the African Court of Justice — are being built simultaneously and deliberately.

Kenya's foreign affairs vision does not merely endorse this trajectory. It proposes a specific architecture for the African Federal Union — the terminal state of African integration — drawn from the EU's experience but designed for Africa's political economy, history, and diversity. It does so honestly, naming the obstacles without pretending they do not exist.

Why the EU Model is Instructive but Not Sufficient

The EU succeeded because: (1) it began with functional cooperation rather than political union — the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951 was about steel, not sovereignty; (2) it created institutions (the Commission, the Court, the Parliament) that had genuine supranational authority and that member states found it costly to ignore; (3) it used structural funds to make participation attractive for smaller and poorer members — Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Ireland all benefited from EU cohesion funds that made the economic case for membership compelling; (4) it created a common currency — imperfectly, and with costs that became visible in the 2010s debt crisis, but it created genuine economic integration.

The EU model is insufficient for Africa because: (1) Africa's colonial borders are more artificial and more contested than Europe's; (2) Africa's economic size disparities are more extreme — Nigeria's GDP is larger than the next 40 African countries combined; (3) Africa lacks Europe's mid-20th century shared security threat that made integration politically urgent; (4) Africa has a living tradition of ethnic and clan identity that European nation-states spent centuries suppressing — the African Federal Union must accommodate this diversity rather than assume it away.

The African Federal Union this document proposes is therefore closer to a Federal Union than a unitary state — closer to the United States (federated states with genuine retained sovereignty) than to France (unitary state with limited regional autonomy). The African Federal Union is a union of nations, not a dissolution of nations.

4.2 The Architecture — Five Pillars

Pillar	Design
PILLAR ONE — The African Common Market (ACM)	The AfCFTA's full implementation — zero tariffs on 97% of goods, services liberalisation, harmonised investment rules, digital trade protocol, competition policy, intellectual property — is Pillar One. It is already underway. Kenya's contribution: accelerate the Rules of Origin resolution (textiles and automotive) which is the primary bottleneck to AfCFTA operationalisation. Kenya's textile industry (Rivatex, EPZ manufacturers) has a direct interest in rules of origin that protect African-made fabric. Kenya proposes a bilateral rules of origin fast-track with each EASGR partner country, creating a network of bilateral RoO agreements that de facto establishes the continental standard before the full AfCFTA negotiation concludes.
PILLAR TWO — The African Infrastructure Union (AIU)	The EASGR, the East African Power Pool, the Pan-African Digital Backbone, the African single aviation market (Yamoussoukro Decision), and the African Blue Economy maritime highway — all physically integrated infrastructure that makes economic integration not a choice but a consequence. The AIU is financed through the African Infrastructure Investment Bank (proposed — an AfDB subsidiary with a specific infrastructure mandate and revenue-backed bond issuance authority). Kenya proposes the AIIB at the AU summit and leads the capitalisation drive. The AIIB's model: like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, with African majority ownership and African governing board, but with KECA-model sovereign protection terms embedded in its lending conditions.
PILLAR THREE — The Pan-African Payment and Settlement System (PAPSS) at full scale	PAPSS is already operational across 15 central banks. Full continental adoption — all 54 AU member states, all commercial banks — eliminates the USD correspondent banking premium that currently adds $5B+ per year to intra-African trade costs. Kenya's role: lobby for mandatory PAPSS integration as a condition of AfCFTA preferential tariff access. A country cannot benefit from AfCFTA zero tariffs unless its banks are connected to PAPSS — this creates the incentive for adoption without the coercion of a mandate.
PILLAR FOUR — The African Court of Justice and the Rule of Law	The African Federal Union requires courts that work. The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights exists but has limited jurisdiction and compliance. The African Court of Justice — the continental commercial and constitutional court — must be strengthened with compulsory jurisdiction for AfCFTA commercial disputes, enforcement mechanisms with real teeth, and the financial independence to recruit and retain judiciary of the highest calibre. Kenya proposes a 0.1% levy on all AfCFTA trade to fund the African Court of Justice — self-financing through the trade it governs.
PILLAR FIVE — The African Federal Assembly (AFA)	The terminal institution of the African Federal Union. Not a government — a legislature. The AFA passes continental legislation in the areas of the common market, infrastructure, environmental standards, human rights, and monetary union. It is directly elected by the citizens of member states on a population-weighted basis. It is NOT a replacement for national parliaments —

Pillar	Design
	it is a legislature for genuinely continental issues only, on the principle of subsidiarity: what can be decided at the national level is decided at the national level; only genuinely continental issues go to the AFA. The AFA's first session is 2060 — Agenda 2063 minus three years, to build the institutional infrastructure in time.

4.3 The Sequencing — Honest About the Obstacles

African political union has been discussed for 60 years. It has not happened because: (1) African heads of state are understandably reluctant to cede sovereignty to a continental institution that they do not control; (2) economic size disparities create distributional conflicts — Nigeria and South Africa fear being outvoted by 40 smaller countries; (3) security conflicts within and between member states (DRC, Somalia, Sudan, Ethiopia-Eritrea, South Sudan) make political trust difficult to build; (4) the colonial languages — French, English, Portuguese, Arabic, Spanish — create communication barriers that reflect real cultural differences. Kenya's vision is honest about these obstacles. It proposes to route around them through functional integration rather than through political negotiation.

Phase	Timeline	What Happens
Phase 1 — Functional Integration	Years 1–10 (2025–2035)	AfCFTA Rules of Origin resolved. PAPSS full continental adoption. EASGR first five corridors operational. East African Power Pool Kenya surplus exports begin. EAC Digital Single Market launched. EAC Niche Product Register operational. African Infrastructure Investment Bank established and capitalised. EAC Political Confederation formally adopted (already agreed in principle by EAC Heads of State in 2017). Kenya's KNDP generates the revenue base and the institutional expertise to lead.
Phase 2 — Institutional Deepening	Years 10–20 (2035–2045)	African Common Market fully operational across all 54 states. African Court of Justice jurisdiction compulsory for trade disputes. AIIB has financed 50+ continental infrastructure projects. EAC Monetary Union (common currency for EAC member states) negotiated and agreed. African Federal Assembly constitutional framework negotiated and ratified by 38+ states (two-thirds threshold). PAPSS has eliminated the USD correspondent banking premium — intra-African trade conducted entirely in African currencies.
Phase 3 — Federal Union	Years 20–38 (2045–2063)	African Federal Assembly first election. African Common Market becomes African Customs Union (common external tariff). African single currency operational for trade (not necessarily for domestic transactions — the Federal Union accommodates national currencies alongside the continental unit).

Phase	Timeline	What Happens
		African Court of Justice becomes the Supreme Court of the Federal Union for continental matters. Agenda 2063 target: a prosperous, integrated, and peaceful Africa by 2063. The KRC network, 40 years after its construction, carries freight from Mombasa to Addis Ababa, Lagos to Nairobi, Dakar to Dar es Salaam — not as a Kenyan railway but as an African one.

3.7 THE EAST AFRICAN INTEGRATION PROTOCOL — ALL DOMAINS

The European Union is, at its core, a cooperation-to-integration architecture built domain by domain over seventy years. It began with steel and coal in 1951. It added agriculture (1962), trade (1968), monetary cooperation (1979), the single market (1993), the euro (1999), and by 2024 had reached into every domain of economic and social life — energy, health, digital, defence, culture, research, spatial planning, migration, justice. The architecture is not complete and it is not perfect. But the lesson is clear: integration that touches only trade and infrastructure is fragile. Integration that reaches into agriculture, health, education, culture, and daily life is durable because it creates constituencies for its own continuation in every community it touches.

The East African Community's treaty already envisages integration across all of these domains. The EAC Treaty covers trade, monetary union, transport, energy, agriculture, health, education, environment, culture, and security. What it lacks is the specific, operational collaboration protocols that turn treaty language into lived experience. The following section sets out those protocols — domain by domain — as Kenya's diplomatic proposal for what EAC integration actually looks like when it is functioning. This is Kenya's agenda for the EAC Council of Ministers, the EAC Sectoral Committees, and the EAC Legislative Assembly. It is also Kenya's template for eventual African Federal Union integration architecture.

The Integration Principle Governing Every Domain

Each domain below follows a common architecture: CURRENT STATE (where EAC integration stands today), COLLABORATION PROTOCOL (the specific joint institution, shared standard, or binding agreement Kenya proposes), DIPLOMATIC ACTION (what Kenya does bilaterally and multilaterally to advance it), and INTEGRATION TARGET (the EU-equivalent outcome — not as a destination but as a direction).

The principle across every domain: begin with technical cooperation (which requires no sovereignty transfer), deepen into harmonisation (which requires agreement on common standards), and arrive at integration (which creates joint institutions that govern the domain collectively). No domain jumps from zero to integration. Every domain travels the same road at its own pace.

3.7.1 Trade — From Customs Union to Common Market

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EAC Customs Union operational since 2005. Common external tariff partially applied. Single Customs Territory reducing border processing times. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain the primary constraint — product standards, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, import bans, and administrative delays account for 60–

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	70% of the remaining trade cost. Intra-EAC trade: 15–20% of total trade. EU equivalent: 65%.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Single Market Protocol — full operationalisation of the four freedoms: goods, services, capital, and persons. Kenya proposes an annual EAC NTB Elimination Report — every identified NTB across all eight member states catalogued, assigned to a responsible ministry, and tracked to elimination with a binding 18-month maximum resolution time. NTBs that are not resolved within 18 months are automatically escalated to the EAC Court of Justice for enforcement.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables the NTB Elimination Report Protocol at the EAC Council of Ministers during its chairmanship year. Kenya proposes an EAC Trade Facilitation Fund — capitalised by a 0.05% levy on all intra-EAC trade — to finance one-stop border posts, electronic certificates of origin, and NTB monitoring infrastructure.
Integration target	EAC Common Market with full single market for goods and services by 2035. Rules of origin harmonised with AfCFTA. EAC Trade in Services Agreement operational. EAC becomes a single WTO customs territory by 2040.

3.7.2 Energy — The East African Power Pool as a Real Institution

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EAPP exists on paper with 10 member states. Ethiopia exports to Djibouti and Sudan. Kenya-Uganda interconnection exists but underutilised. No harmonised grid codes. No cross-border power trading agreement with real-time pricing. No common regulatory framework for power import and export. Countries build generation capacity independently, creating duplication and waste.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Energy Integration Protocol — five binding components: (1) EAPP Pool Price formula published quarterly by EAPP Secretariat, cost-plus-return, transparent methodology; (2) Harmonised Grid Code adopted by all member states by Year 3; (3) Cross-Border Power Trade Agreement giving every EAC member state access to the pool surplus at the Pool Price with Kenyan governing law and EAC Court dispute resolution; (4) Regional Generation Investment Coordination — no member state commissions generation above 100 MW without notifying the EAPP Secretariat, which assesses whether the regional pool already has sufficient capacity in that zone; (5) EAC Renewable Energy Target — 80% renewable generation across the combined EAC grid by 2035, with Kenya's geothermal and Ethiopia's hydro as the baseload anchors.

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Diplomatic action	Kenya and Ethiopia sign the Baseload-Hydro Complementarity Agreement as the foundational bilateral instrument. Kenya hosts the EAPP Secretariat's technical harmonisation workshops annually at the KECA facility. Kenya proposes to the AU Energy Commission that the EAPP model be adopted as the template for all African Regional Power Pools (WAPP, SAPP, NAPP, CAPP).
Integration target	A single East African electricity market by 2040 — power flowing freely across all eight member states at transparent prices, financed by a common EAC Energy Infrastructure Bond. DRC's Grand Inga 3 integrated into the pool from first generation.

3.7.3 Transport — One Corridor, One Standard, One Bill of Lading

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EASGR in planning. Northern Corridor (Mombasa–Nairobi–Kampala–Kigali) the most developed trade route. Central Corridor (Dar es Salaam–Kigali) in competition with Northern. Aviation: EAC airlines compete rather than codeshare. Maritime: Mombasa and Dar es Salaam compete for the same hinterland cargo. Road: 36% of EAC regional roads paved. Transit costs: 30–45% of cargo value for landlocked states.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Integrated Transport Protocol — four modes: (1) RAIL: EASGR as described in Section 3.1 — nine countries, one gauge, one operating standard, one bill of lading from Mombasa to any inland destination across EAC; (2) ROAD: EAC Road Transport Harmonisation — common axle load limits, common vehicle safety standards, common driver licence recognised across EAC, one-stop border posts at all major crossings; (3) AVIATION: EAC Open Skies Agreement — full Yamoussoukro Decision implementation, EAC-wide codesharing, harmonised air traffic management, joint negotiation of intercontinental landing rights as the EAC bloc rather than individual airlines; (4) MARITIME: Mombasa-Dar collaboration protocol — joint marketing of East African ports to international shipping lines, coordinated berthing schedules, shared container tracking system.
Diplomatic action	Kenya proposes EAC-wide adoption of the EASGR single bill of lading at the EAC Transport Ministers' meeting. Kenya and Tanzania sign a Mombasa-Dar Port Complementarity Agreement — presenting the two ports as a redundant system rather than competitors. Kenya tables EAC Open Skies at the East African Civil Aviation Authority.
Integration target	Transport costs for landlocked EAC states below 15% of cargo value by 2040 (from current 30–45%). EAC becomes a single transport market.

3.7.4 Agriculture — From Food Insecurity to Regional Food System

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EAC countries collectively produce enough food calories for regional sufficiency but distribution failures, national export bans during shortage, and border friction create food crises in surplus years for some and shortage years for others simultaneously. Every EAC country maintains separate strategic grain reserves. No coordinated pest and disease early warning system. No common SPS (sanitary and phytosanitary) standards — same product rejected at one border, accepted at another.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Food System Integration Protocol: (1) EAC Common SPS Framework — harmonised standards for food safety, pesticide residue limits, and animal health certification, administered by a joint EAC Food Safety Authority; (2) EAC Strategic Food Reserve — pooled regional grain reserve managed by the EAC Secretariat, capitalised by member state contributions proportional to GDP, releasing into deficit areas at cost price; (3) EAC Agricultural Export Protocol — no member state may impose an export ban on food commodities without EAC Secretariat approval and a 30-day transition period, preventing the unilateral bans that create regional crises; (4) KAERS EAC Extension Network (described in Section 6) — shared pest and disease early warning; (5) EAC Seed Harmonisation — common variety registration, so a seed approved in Kenya can be sold in Uganda without re-registration.
Diplomatic action	Kenya leads EAC SPS harmonisation as Chair, proposing adoption of the EAC Food Safety Authority at the EAC Sectoral Committee on Agriculture. Kenya tables the Export Protocol at the Council of Ministers — the no-unilateral-ban rule is the most politically sensitive element and requires Presidential-level commitment from all Heads of State.
Integration target	EAC Regional Food System in which no EAC member state experiences food crisis while another has surplus — by 2035. EAC common agricultural market fully operational.

3.7.5 Health — The East African Health Union

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EAC member states face common disease burdens (malaria, TB, HIV, NCD, maternal mortality) but operate completely separate health systems. No joint pharmaceutical procurement. No mutual recognition of medical qualifications. Cross-border disease surveillance is ad hoc. EAC citizens cannot access public health services in a partner country without paying foreigner rates. EAC

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	has no equivalent of the EU's ECDC (European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control) or EMA (European Medicines Agency).
Collaboration protocol	EAC Health Integration Protocol — five instruments: (1) EAC Centre for Disease Control (EAC-CDC) — joint disease surveillance, outbreak response, and health data system; funded by a 0.1% levy on member states' health budgets; headquartered in Nairobi (Kenya has the most advanced health infrastructure in the region); (2) EAC Joint Pharmaceutical Procurement Agency — pooling member states' procurement volumes for essential medicines achieves the same price reductions that Gavi achieves for vaccines; Kenya's pharmaceutical manufacturing ambition means Kenya eventually supplies a portion of the pool's needs; (3) EAC Mutual Recognition of Medical Qualifications — a doctor, nurse, or paramedic qualified in any EAC member state can practice in any other without re-examination, subject to a 6-month orientation; (4) KNAC EAC Ambulance Standard (described in Section 6) — common response time standards across EAC; (5) EAC Universal Health Coverage Compact — all EAC citizens accessing public health services in any member state pay domestic rates, not foreigner rates; funded by a small cross-border health levy.
Diplomatic action	Kenya proposes the EAC-CDC at the EAC Health Ministers' summit and offers Nairobi as headquarters. Kenya leads EAC pharmaceutical procurement pooling through its ADBK-model collective purchasing architecture. The KNAC standard is tabled as the EAC ambulance benchmark.
Integration target	A functional East African Health Union by 2035 — shared disease surveillance, joint pharmaceutical procurement, mutual qualification recognition, and cross-border health access for all EAC citizens.

3.7.6 Education — The East African Education Area

The full education collaboration architecture is described in Section 6.1. Summary: EAC Common Early Childhood Framework, EAC Sister Schools Programme (primary), EAC Baccalaureate and Student Exchange (secondary), EAC KNQF Mutual Recognition (TVET), EAC Research Universities Consortium — EARUC (university and postgraduate), EAC Corporate Academy Network, and Swahili as the EAC common academic language. The diplomatic action: Kenya tables the EAC Qualifications Mutual Recognition Agreement at the EAC Inter-University Council and the EAC Education Ministers' Sectoral Committee. Integration target: an EAC Education Area equivalent to the EU's Bologna Process — by 2035, any EAC qualification is recognised across the community for employment, further study, and professional practice.

3.7.7 Water Security — Shared Basins, Shared Governance

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	East Africa shares major transboundary water systems: the Nile Basin (Ethiopia, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi, DRC, South Sudan, Sudan, Egypt), the Rift Valley lakes (Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda), Lake Victoria (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania), the Tana-Athi system (Kenya-Ethiopia border aquifers), and the Congo River system (DRC, Rwanda, Burundi). No binding water-sharing agreement governs most of these systems. Ethiopia's GERD created a decade of Nile Basin conflict with Egypt and Sudan — unresolved because there was no agreed governance framework. Lake Victoria's fishing stock has collapsed partly due to uncoordinated national fishing policies.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Water Security Protocol — four components: (1) EAC Shared Basin Governance Framework — for each transboundary river, lake, and aquifer shared by two or more EAC member states, a joint Basin Authority with binding allocation rules, environmental flow minimum requirements, and dispute resolution through the EAC Court; (2) Lake Victoria Authority — reconstituted as a full joint authority managing fisheries, water quality, navigation, and riparian development across Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania; (3) EAC Hydrological Intelligence Network — an extension of Kenya's KWCMC Hydrological Intelligence Unit to a regional sensor network; real-time rainfall, river flow, and aquifer data shared across all EAC member states; (4) EAC Drought Response Protocol — triggers and response mechanisms agreed in advance so that a drought in one member state activates automatic water-sharing adjustments from member states with current surplus, without requiring bilateral negotiation during a crisis.
Diplomatic action	Kenya proposes the EAC Shared Basin Governance Framework at the Nile Basin Initiative and the Lake Victoria Basin Commission. Kenya and Ethiopia negotiate the Tana-Athi Transboundary Aquifer Agreement as a model bilateral instrument. Kenya hosts the EAC Hydrological Intelligence Network server on Wingu la Taifa.
Integration target	Every transboundary water system in East Africa governed by a joint authority with binding rules and EAC Court enforcement by 2035.

3.7.8 Environment — The East African Green Compact

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EAC member states share ecosystems that cross borders — the Serengeti-Mara ecosystem (Kenya-Tanzania), the Virunga volcanoes (DRC-Rwanda-Uganda), the Albertine Rift (DRC-Uganda-Rwanda-Burundi-Tanzania), the Indian Ocean coastal marine system, and the East African highlands forest belt. Each is managed by separate national agencies with no binding cross-

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	border protocol. Poaching in one country depletes wildlife that tours in another. Deforestation in one country's watershed degrades water security in another.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Green Compact — five instruments: (1) EAC Transboundary Conservation Network — all cross-border ecosystems managed under joint protocols, with the Serengeti-Mara as the first full implementation (Kenya-Tanzania joint anti-poaching unit, joint visitor management, shared revenue formula); (2) EAC Carbon Market — a regional voluntary carbon market operating under Article 6 of Paris, with Kenya's National Carbon Registry as the clearing house; EAC member states' forests, mangroves, and soil carbon are offered as a combined regional asset to international buyers, achieving higher prices through scale; (3) EAC Marine Protected Area Network — the Indian Ocean coast from Somalia to Tanzania governed as a single marine corridor, with jointly funded MPA management; (4) EAC Environmental Court Division — within the EAC Court of Justice, a dedicated division for environmental disputes, including cross-border pollution, transboundary wildlife crime, and illegal mineral extraction; (5) EAC Restoration Compact — 10 million hectares of degraded land restored across EAC by 2040, each member state allocated a restoration target proportional to its degraded land area, jointly monitored by the EAC Green Compact Secretariat.
Diplomatic action	Kenya proposes the EAC Green Compact at the AU Climate Summit and uses its Mazingira programme as the demonstration case. Kenya leads the EAC Carbon Market architecture, leveraging its National Carbon Registry as the continental model.
Integration target	East Africa is a net carbon sink by 2045. EAC Transboundary Conservation Network covers all major shared ecosystems. EAC Carbon Market is the largest voluntary carbon market in Africa.

3.7.9 Security — The East African Security Community

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	EAC has an East African Standby Force (EASF) for peace support operations. It was deployed in DRC (2023) with mixed results. No common intelligence sharing architecture. No joint border management for the complex Mandera Triangle (Kenya-Ethiopia-Somalia) or the DRC-Rwanda-Uganda border. Counter-terrorism cooperation is bilateral and ad hoc. Cross-border crime (cattle rustling, illegal arms, human trafficking) is not addressed by any EAC joint enforcement mechanism.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Security Integration Protocol — five instruments: (1) EAC Intelligence Sharing Framework — a secure, classified, joint intelligence platform linking Kenya's NIS, Uganda's ISO, Rwanda's

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	DMI, Tanzania's SIS, and their counterparts; governed by an EAC Intelligence Oversight Board with Parliamentary representation from each member state; (2) EAC Joint Border Management Units — at all major EAC crossings (Busia, Malaba, Namanga, Taveta, Isibania, Katuna, Gatuna), joint Kenya-partner country border posts staffed by both countries' police, customs, and immigration jointly; (3) EAC Counter-Terrorism Protocol — standardised intelligence sharing on extremist movement, joint de-radicalisation programme, and joint training under Kenya's KIACC model; (4) EASF reform — the East African Standby Force reconstituted with defined command structure, clear mandate, and pre-positioned equipment; Kenya contributes logistics expertise and the KNAC air wing as a medical support asset; (5) EAC Maritime Security Protocol — joint Indian Ocean patrol for piracy, illegal fishing, and smuggling, with Kenya's navy and Tanzania's navy as the primary assets, coordinated with EU NAVFOR.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables the EAC Intelligence Sharing Framework at the EAC heads of intelligence meeting (classified channel). Kenya leads the EASF reform proposal at the EAC Heads of State Summit. Kenya and Ethiopia negotiate the Mandera Triangle Trilateral Security Protocol with Somalia as the foundational cross-border security instrument.
Integration target	An EAC Security Community — not a defence union but a community of security cooperation — by 2035, equivalent to EU Europol and Frontex in function.

3.7.10 Tourism — The East African Circuit (see also Section 3.3)

The full tourism collaboration architecture is described in Section 3.3. Summary: EAC Single Tourist Visa, EASGR passenger circuit, joint East African Tourism Board marketing, complementary positioning of each country's distinct product, and a three-way park fee revenue split (60% host country conservation, 20% EAC Transboundary Conservation Fund, 20% host communities). Diplomatic action: Kenya tables the EAC Single Tourist Visa extension at the EAC Council of Ministers and the EAC Immigration Sectoral Committee. Integration target: East Africa is the world's premier nature and heritage tourism circuit by 2040, generating USD 15B+ annually across all eight member states combined — up from current combined total of approximately USD 7B.

3.7.11 Culture and Heritage — The East African Cultural Union

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	East Africa has one of the world's richest cultural heritages — the

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	Swahili civilisation's coastal architecture, the Great Lakes kingdoms' art, the East African Rift's hominin heritage (Olduvai Gorge, Lake Turkana), the Ethiopian Orthodox heritage (Lalibela, Axum), the Nilotic and Bantu oral traditions, the Indian Ocean trade culture. These are managed entirely as national heritage assets with minimal cross-border cooperation. The East African Swahili civilisation that stretches from Mogadishu to Mozambique is nowhere managed as the single heritage it is.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Cultural Union Protocol — four instruments: (1) EAC World Heritage Joint Nominations — EAC member states jointly nominate transboundary cultural and natural heritage sites to UNESCO, achieving the international recognition that individual nominations sometimes fail to; the East African Rift Hominin Heritage Corridor (covering sites in Kenya, Tanzania, Ethiopia, and Uganda) is the flagship joint nomination; (2) EAC Cultural Content Fund — 0.2% of each member state's tourism revenue pooled to fund co-productions in film, music, literature, and performing arts; output branded as 'East African' rather than single-country; (3) Swahili as the EAC Official Language — full operationalisation of Swahili as the EAC's working language in all institutions, publications, and schools, with simultaneous support for mother tongue literacy; (4) EAC Heritage Site Maintenance Compact — KSBC's building conservation expertise extended to partner countries' heritage structures; KSBC trains heritage conservation artisans across EAC to a common standard.
Diplomatic action	Kenya leads the EAC Cultural Union Protocol at the EAC Arts and Culture Sectoral Committee. Kenya proposes the East African Rift joint UNESCO nomination with Ethiopia and Tanzania at the next UNESCO World Heritage Committee session. Kenya's Utamaduni programme positions the Nairobi Film Studio and the KATS (Kenya Arts and Theatre Service) as regional hubs that partner country artists access.
Integration target	East African cultural products — Swahili literature, East African film, the EAC music industry — are globally recognised as an East African cultural identity by 2040, equivalent to how 'African music' is now shorthand for West African music.

3.7.12 Sports — The East African Sports Union

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	East Africa is a global sports powerhouse in distance running (Kenya and Ethiopia dominate global marathon and track results) and increasingly in football, cricket, and rugby. The East African Safari Rally was once the world's most prestigious rally event. But the region competes individually — a Kenyan runner, a Ugandan swimmer, an Ethiopan marathon champion — not as a coordinated

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	regional programme that maximises collective medal counts, commercial value, and infrastructure investment.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Sports Union Protocol — five instruments: (1) East Africa Olympic Programme — EAC member states coordinate their Olympic preparation, sharing training facilities (Kenya's 14 Sports Institutes are open to EAC partner country athletes), coaching expertise, and sports science resources; East African athletes train together, compete nationally, and support each other internationally; (2) East African Professional Leagues — EAC-wide professional leagues in football, basketball, and cricket where the top clubs from each member state compete; the East African Football League (EAFL) creates the same regional competition that the Champions League creates in Europe — cross-border fan engagement, commercial sponsorship, and talent development; (3) EAC Sports Infrastructure Compact — KSBC's school sports facility standard (pool, field, court) is the EAC school sports minimum, rolled out across partner countries under KSBC's technical assistance programme; (4) East Africa Athletics Institute — building on Kenya's Iten model, a regional high-altitude training centre (Iten already receives athletes from Uganda, Ethiopia, Burundi, and Tanzania) formally constituted as an EAC institution with jointly funded coaching and sports science; (5) Bid for the 2060 East African Olympic Games — EAC member states jointly bid to host the 2060 Olympic Games as the East African Community, distributing events across Nairobi (main stadium), Mombasa (sailing, swimming), Kampala (football), Kigali (cycling), and Dar es Salaam (beach sports). The bid process begins at Year 15 of the programme.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables the EAC Sports Union Protocol at the EAC Youth, Sports and Culture Sectoral Committee. Kenya proposes the EAFL to the Council of East and Central Africa Football Associations (CECAFA). Kenya's 14 Sports Institutes are formally designated EAC Regional Training Centres.
Integration target	East Africa is a unified global sports brand by 2040 — East African athletes supported by a regional system, East African professional leagues commercially viable, and the East African Olympics bid submitted.

3.7.13 Fisheries and Livestock — The East African Blue and Pastoral Economy

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	Lake Victoria's Nile perch fishery — once a USD 500M/year industry — has been in severe decline due to overfishing, pollution, and invasive water hyacinth, managed by three separate national

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	fisheries authorities (Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania) without binding joint management. The Indian Ocean fishery is subject to illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing by distant-water fleets from Europe and Asia, with EAC member states too individually small to mount effective surveillance. Pastoralist livestock — a USD 40B+ industry across the ASAL zones — crosses borders daily but is managed by nine separate veterinary authorities with incompatible disease certification standards.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Fisheries and Livestock Integration Protocol — four instruments: (1) Lake Victoria Joint Fisheries Authority — legally binding management body with quotas, gear restrictions, closed seasons, and pollution controls binding on all three riparian states; funded by a levy on commercial fish landings; (2) East African Maritime Fisheries Zone (EAMFZ) — EAC member states with Indian Ocean coastline (Kenya, Tanzania, Somalia) declare a jointly managed 200-nautical-mile EEZ where EAC navies jointly enforce IUU fishing exclusions; a single EAC fishing licence replaces three national licences for vessels operating across the zone; (3) EAC Pastoralist Livestock Protocol — harmonised veterinary certification across all nine member states, so a pastoralist herd vaccinated in Kenya can cross to Ethiopia and Tanzania without re-certification; EAC Livestock Identification and Traceability System (digital) tracks animals across borders; (4) EAC Aquaculture Development Programme — joint investment in cage aquaculture on Lake Victoria, Lake Turkana, and Lake Tanganyika, with KLIC providing the irrigation and water management infrastructure and KFPEC providing the processing equipment.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables the Lake Victoria Joint Fisheries Authority at the Lake Victoria Basin Commission — upgrading from advisory to binding. Kenya leads the EAMFZ declaration with Tanzania and Somalia at the EAC Sectoral Committee on Maritime Affairs. Kenya proposes the Pastoralist Livestock Protocol at IGAD's livestock committee.
Integration target	Sustainable fisheries management across all EAC water bodies by 2035. East African pastoralist economy integrated into formal markets through the EAC traceability system and the Kenya Rangeland Beef Brand.

3.7.14 Manufacturing — The East African Industrial Common Market

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	Manufacturing in East Africa is overwhelmingly national. Kenya's industrial base is the largest, but it serves primarily the Kenyan market. Intra-EAC manufactured goods trade is constrained by

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
	NTBs and rules of origin disputes. No EAC industrial policy exists. EAC member states compete individually for the same FDI from global manufacturers — undercutting each other on tax incentives and labour standards in a race to the bottom that produces little genuine industrial development.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Industrial Common Market Protocol — five instruments: (1) EAC Industrial Specialisation Map — annually updated joint assessment of each EAC economy's industrial capacity, identifying where complementarity exists and where duplication creates wasteful competition; Kenya: steel (KISC), equipment manufacturing (KFPEC), pharmaceuticals, digital services; Tanzania: cement, food processing, textiles, natural gas petrochemicals; Uganda: agro-processing, plastics, construction materials; Rwanda: ICT hardware assembly, specialty chemicals; Ethiopia: textiles (Hawassa Industrial Park is the world's most competitive garment producer), food processing, leather; (2) EAC Joint Investment Promotion — EAC presents a unified industrial investment proposition to global manufacturers — the EAC is a market of 300M+ people with common standards, one customs territory, and a trained workforce; individual countries stop competing against each other for the same investor; (3) EAC Common Product Standards — harmonised standards so that a product manufactured to EAC standard can be sold anywhere in the community without re-testing; (4) EAC SME Support Network — KFPEC's equipment manufacturing capabilities are available to SME manufacturers across EAC at published rates; KSBC's construction services are available across EAC; (5) EAC Industrial Development Fund — 0.1% of GDP from each member state pooled to finance industrial parks, SEZ infrastructure, and the EAMTI in locations identified by the Industrial Specialisation Map as strategic.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables the EAC Industrial Common Market Protocol at the EAC Trade and Industry Sectoral Committee. Kenya proposes joint EAC investment missions to Korea, Germany, India, and the Gulf — presenting the EAC as the investment destination, not Kenya alone.
Integration target	EAC manufactured goods constitute 25% of total intra-EAC trade by 2040 (up from current 8%). EAC is a recognised manufacturing location for global value chains in three sectors: agro-processing, textiles, and light engineering.

3.7.15 Mining — Collaborative Governance (see also Section 3.4)

The full minerals collaboration architecture is described in Section 3.4. Summary: East African Minerals Intelligence Unit (EAMIU), EAC Consolidated Minerals Negotiating Unit (CMNU) for critical minerals, EAC Minerals Training Institute (EAMTI) at three sites, EAC Transboundary Minerals Royalty Fund (10% of royalties

pooled), and a common beneficiation schedule. Diplomatic action: Kenya tables the CMNU at the EAC Natural Resources Sectoral Committee. Kenya leads negotiation of the first CMNU offtake agreement — targeting EAC cobalt and coltan supply to Korean and Japanese battery manufacturers on collectively negotiated terms. Integration target: EAC minerals sector produces refined metals for 50% of its endowment by 2040. EAC negotiates as a bloc in all critical mineral supply agreements.

3.7.16 Labour — The EAC Labour Market

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	The EAC Common Market Protocol provides for free movement of workers — but implementation is incomplete. Work permits are still required in most member states. Qualifications are not mutually recognised. Social protection does not follow workers across borders — a Kenyan working in Uganda loses access to NSSF contributions. The informal labour market is integrated (cross-border movement of agricultural workers, domestic workers, and construction workers is extensive) but the formal labour market is not.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Labour Market Integration Protocol — four instruments: (1) EAC Work Permit Elimination — all EAC member states eliminate work permit requirements for EAC citizens by Year 5, replacing with a simple EAC Work Notification (a 7-day online registration, not an application subject to approval); (2) EAC Portable Social Protection — NSSF contributions follow the worker; an EAC Portable Social Protection Account is linked to the EAC Common Digital Identity, accumulating contributions from any EAC member state's social security system and paying out in the member state of retirement; (3) EAC Minimum Wage Coordination — not a common minimum wage (economic diversity is too great) but a minimum wage transparency protocol: each member state publishes its minimum wage in the EAC Wage Register, and no member state may reduce its minimum wage below 80% of its previous level without EAC Secretariat review; (4) EAC Labour Rights Charter — binding minimum labour standards across the community: right to organise, prohibition of forced labour, prohibition of child labour, minimum occupational health and safety standards — enforceable through the EAC Court.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables the EAC Work Permit Elimination at the EAC Free Movement of Persons Sectoral Committee. Kenya proposes the EAC Portable Social Protection Account at the EAC Social Policy Sectoral Committee, with Kenya's NSSF digital architecture as the technical platform.
Integration target	A functional EAC Labour Market by 2035 — EAC citizens move freely for work across all member states, with portable social protection, mutually recognised qualifications, and common labour rights standards.

3.7.17 Spatial Planning — The East African Territorial Agenda

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	No cross-border spatial planning exists in East Africa. The Nairobi Metropolitan Region extends economically into Uganda and Tanzania but is planned entirely within Kenya's borders. The LAPSSET corridor (Lamu–South Sudan–Ethiopia Transport Corridor) creates a development axis that crosses three countries but is planned by three separate national planning bodies. Border towns — Malaba, Namanga, Busia, Lunga Lunga — are on opposite sides of an administrative line but function as single economic units; they are planned by two different countries with no coordination.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Territorial Cohesion Protocol — four instruments: (1) EAC Cross-Border Metropolitan Cooperation — for every major border conurbation, a Joint Metropolitan Planning Authority with representation from both countries' local governments; first priority: Malaba-Busia (Kenya-Uganda), Namanga (Kenya-Tanzania), Lunga Lunga–Horohoro (Kenya-Tanzania); (2) EAC Corridor Development Plan — for each EASGR corridor, a Corridor Development Plan jointly produced by the planning ministries of all corridor countries, coordinating land use, settlement policy, conservation zones, and industrial siting along the railway right-of-way; (3) EAC Regional Capital Cities Network — Nairobi, Kampala, Dar es Salaam, Kigali, Addis Ababa, Mogadishu, Juba, and Bujumbura form an EAC Capital Cities Cooperation Network — sharing urban data, co-investing in cross-border urban infrastructure, and jointly planning the EASGR's urban terminus designs; (4) EAC Land Use Data Platform — hosted on Wingu la Taifa, providing open access to satellite-derived land use data across the entire EAC territory, enabling any member state's planning authority to see what is happening on the other side of their border.
Diplomatic action	Kenya proposes the EAC Territorial Cohesion Protocol at the EAC Regional Development and Spatial Planning Sectoral Committee (a committee that does not yet formally exist — Kenya proposes its establishment as part of the protocol). Kenya's ArdhiSasa is offered as the shared land data platform.
Integration target	Every major EAC border zone has a Joint Metropolitan Planning Authority by 2035. Every EASGR corridor has a coordinated Corridor Development Plan. The EAC manages its territory as a coherent spatial unit.

3.7.18 Science and Technology — The EAC Research and Innovation Union

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	East Africa's combined R&D expenditure is less than 0.5% of combined GDP (EU target is 3% of GDP). No joint research funding mechanism. University research is nationally siloed. Technology transfer from universities to industry is minimal. Kenya's Konza Technopolis is the region's most significant science and technology infrastructure investment but operates as a national asset. Kenya has the Malindi Space Station — the oldest space station in Africa — underutilised in the regional context.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Research and Innovation Union Protocol — four instruments: (1) EAC Research and Innovation Fund — capitalised at 0.5% of combined EAC GDP annually by member states, managed by the EARUC (East African Research Universities Consortium), disbursed through competitive grants to multi-country research teams; priority research areas: agricultural productivity, mineral beneficiation technology, climate adaptation, urban settlement, health systems, and the EAC integration process itself; (2) Malindi Space Station — EAC designation of Kenya's Malindi Space Station as an EAC regional space facility, opening it to EAC member state researchers for satellite tracking, earth observation, and atmospheric science; (3) EAC Technology Transfer Compact — all research institutions receiving EAC Research and Innovation Fund grants are required to have a technology transfer office and a commercialisation pathway for research outputs; KAERS and KLIC are the primary industry partners for agricultural and water technology; (4) EAC Digital Innovation Hub Network — Kenya's Konza Technopolis, Kigali Innovation City, Uganda's Kampala Innovation Hub, and Tanzania's Dar es Salaam Technology Park form a connected network with shared infrastructure, cross-border residency for innovators, and a common EAC digital innovation visa.
Diplomatic action	Kenya proposes the EAC Research and Innovation Union at the EAC Education, Research and Technology Sectoral Committee. Kenya tables the Malindi Space Station EAC designation at the AU Space Agency. Kenya leads the EAC-EU Horizon Research Partnership — requesting that EAC institutions be eligible for EU Horizon research funding on the same terms as associate members.
Integration target	EAC R&D expenditure reaches 1% of combined GDP by 2035 (doubling from current 0.5%). East African researchers publish jointly. East African technology is commercialised in the EAC market.

3.7.19 Financial Integration — The East African Monetary Union

Integration Element	Protocol and Diplomatic Action
Current state	The EAC Monetary Union Protocol was signed in 2015 with a 10-year roadmap to a single currency. The roadmap has not been implemented. Each member state maintains its own central bank, monetary policy, and currency. Currency conversion costs add 2–5% to every intra-EAC transaction not routed through PAPSS. Capital flows are constrained. No common financial regulatory framework exists — a Kenyan bank operating in Uganda faces a completely separate regulatory environment. The NSE (Nairobi Securities Exchange) is the region's most developed capital market but is not formally integrated with partner exchanges.
Collaboration protocol	EAC Financial Integration Protocol — five instruments: (1) PAPSS full EAC adoption — all commercial banks in all eight member states connected to PAPSS by Year 3; (2) EAC Capital Market Integration — the NSE, Uganda Securities Exchange (USE), Rwanda Stock Exchange (RSE), and Dar es Salaam Stock Exchange (DSE) form an EAC Capital Markets Platform — cross-listing of securities, shared trading infrastructure, common listing standards, single KYC for investors across all four exchanges; (3) EAC Banking Single Market — mutual recognition of banking licences, so a bank licensed in Kenya can operate in Uganda without a separate Ugandan banking licence (subject to host country conduct regulation); (4) EAC Macroeconomic Convergence Framework — binding convergence targets for inflation (single digits), fiscal deficit (below 5% of GDP), debt-to-GDP (below 70%), and reserves (above 4 months import cover) as preconditions for the eventual common currency; (5) EAC Monetary Union — a common East African currency (the East African Shilling) by 2040, issued by an East African Central Bank governed by a board of member state central bank governors.
Diplomatic action	Kenya tables PAPSS full EAC adoption at the EAC Monetary Affairs Committee. Kenya leads the EAC Capital Markets Platform proposal at the East Africa Securities Regulatory Authorities (EASRA). Kenya proposes the EAC Macroeconomic Convergence Framework at the EAC Monetary Affairs Committee and commits Kenya to meeting all five convergence targets by 2030.
Integration target	EAC Monetary Union with a common currency by 2040. EAC is a single financial market by 2035.

3.7.20 Digital and Data — The EAC Digital Union

The full digital collaboration architecture is described in Section 3.6. Summary: EAC Common Digital Identity, PAPSS full integration, EAC E-Government Standards (Kenya's eCitizen as open-source template), EAC Cybersecurity Framework, EAMIU digital platform, and EAPP grid management system on EAC Digital Market infrastructure. Additional element not in Section 3.6: EAC Data Governance Framework — a common framework for data sovereignty, data localisation, data sharing between member state governments, and data protection standards harmonised with the AfCFTA Digital Trade Protocol. Kenya's Data Protection Act is

offered as the template. Integration target: EAC Digital Union — a seamless digital single market for data, services, and digital trade across all eight member states — by 2035. No EAC citizen faces a digital border when transacting, studying, or working across the community.

The Integration Protocol — Summary Table

TRADE: EAC Single Market, NTB Elimination Report, EAC Trade Facilitation Fund → Common Market by 2035.

ENERGY: EAPP Pool Price formula, Harmonised Grid Code, Regional Generation Coordination, Baseload-Hydro Complementarity → East African Electricity Market by 2040.

TRANSPORT: EASGR single bill of lading, EAC Road Harmonisation, EAC Open Skies, Mombasa-Dar complementarity → Transport costs below 15% for landlocked states by 2040.

AGRICULTURE: EAC Food Safety Authority, EAC Strategic Reserve, Export Protocol, KAERS Extension Network, Seed Harmonisation → No food crisis in surplus year by 2035.

HEALTH: EAC-CDC, Joint Pharmaceutical Procurement, Qualification Mutual Recognition, KNAC Standard, Universal Health Coverage Compact → East African Health Union by 2035.

EDUCATION: Common ECE Framework, Sister Schools, EAC Baccalaureate, KNQF Mutual Recognition, EARUC, Corporate Academy Network, Swahili academic language → EAC Education Area by 2035.

WATER: Shared Basin Governance, Lake Victoria Authority, EAC Hydrological Network, Drought Response Protocol → Every transboundary water system jointly governed by 2035.

ENVIRONMENT: Transboundary Conservation Network, EAC Carbon Market, Marine Protected Area Network, EAC Environmental Court, Restoration Compact → Net carbon sink by 2045.

SECURITY: Intelligence Sharing Framework, Joint Border Management, Counter-Terrorism Protocol, EASF reform, Maritime Security Protocol → EAC Security Community by 2035.

TOURISM: Single Tourist Visa, EASGR passenger circuit, East African Tourism Board, Revenue sharing formula → USD 15B+ combined tourism by 2040.

CULTURE/HERITAGE: Joint UNESCO nominations, EAC Cultural Content Fund, Swahili official language, Heritage Conservation Compact → East African cultural identity globally recognised by 2040.

SPORTS: East Africa Olympic Programme, East African Professional Leagues, EAC Sports Infrastructure, East Africa Athletics Institute, 2060 Olympic Bid → EAC unified global sports brand by 2040.

FISHERIES/LIVESTOCK: Lake Victoria Joint Fisheries Authority, EAMFZ, Pastoralist Livestock Protocol, Aquaculture Development Programme → Sustainable fisheries by 2035.

MANUFACTURING: Industrial Specialisation Map, Joint Investment Promotion, Common Product Standards, EAC SME Network, Industrial Development Fund → 25% manufactured goods in intra-EAC trade by 2040.

MINING: EAMIU, CMNU, EAMTI, Royalty Fund, Beneficiation Mandate → Refined metals for 50% of endowment by 2040.

LABOUR: Work Permit Elimination, Portable Social Protection, Minimum Wage Coordination, EAC Labour Rights Charter → Functional EAC Labour Market by 2035.

SPATIAL PLANNING: Cross-Border Metropolitan Cooperation, Corridor Development Plans, Capital Cities Network, Land Use Data Platform → EAC Territorial Cohesion by 2035.

SCIENCE/TECHNOLOGY: EAC R&I Fund, Malindi Space Station EAC designation, Technology Transfer Compact, Digital Innovation Hub Network → 1% of GDP in R&D by 2035.

FINANCIAL INTEGRATION: PAPSS adoption, Capital Markets Platform, Banking Single Market, Macroeconomic Convergence, EAC Common Currency → EAC Monetary Union by 2040.

DIGITAL/DATA: EAC Digital Identity, Data Governance Framework, E-Government Standards, Cybersecurity Framework → EAC Digital Union by 2035.

These twenty domains are the substance of EAC integration. Treaty language is the container. These protocols are the content. Kenya's diplomatic programme — across every bilateral relationship, every EAC Sectoral Committee, every AU summit, every DFI engagement — advances every one of these twenty domains simultaneously. The pace differs by domain. The direction is always the same. Toward the East African Community that 300 million people deserve.

SECTION FIVE

The Trade Architecture — Equal Partnership, Not Absorption

5.1 The Problem of Size Asymmetry

Free trade between unequal economies does not automatically produce equal benefits. The EU's experience demonstrates this clearly: Spain and Portugal, upon accession in 1986, experienced significant deindustrialisation in sectors where German and French firms were more competitive. The corrective — EU Structural Funds, cohesion payments, agricultural subsidies — was designed explicitly to offset the size asymmetry. The AfCFTA and the EAC must build the same corrective into their architecture from the beginning, rather than adding it after the damage has been done.

Kenya's obligation in this architecture is specific: Kenya is the large economy. Kenya's KISC steel, Kenya's KFPEC equipment, Kenya's pharmaceutical industry, Kenya's digital services — all of these are potentially more competitive than equivalent production in Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, or South Sudan. The question is not whether Kenya should develop these industries — it should, and it will — but how Kenya ensures that this development does not simply displace smaller economies' productive capacity.

Trade Architecture Instrument	Design and Kenya's Specific Commitment
EAC Niche Product Register (detailed)	As described in Section 3.4. Kenya's specific commitment: Kenya's government procurement actively purchases from the Register. KSBC's Ward Cooperative Facilities — 1,450 nationally — are required to carry Registered products on their market information terminals and in their aggregation facilities. The Kenya Cooperative Export Mark cannot be applied to a product that competes directly with a Registered product from a partner country unless that product adds material value above the Registered product's unprocessed form.
EAC Industrial Complementarity Map	Kenya's NDFICO and the EAC Secretariat jointly produce an annual Industrial Complementarity Map — identifying where each EAC economy has production capacity and where it has deficits, and designing trade and investment flows that fill deficits with the nearest capable producer rather than with imports from outside Africa. Example: Uganda's dairy processing deficit is filled by Uganda's own cooperative dairy plants financed through ADBK's EAC lending window — not by Kenyan dairy imports. Kenya's role is to train Uganda's cooperative development officers, not to export processed milk.
Graduated tariff reduction for micro-economies	Rwanda, Burundi, South Sudan, and Somalia are designated Micro-Economy EAC Members with a 10-year longer tariff reduction timeline for sensitive sectors. This is not charity — it

Trade Architecture Instrument	Design and Kenya's Specific Commitment
	is the EAC structural adjustment fund equivalent. A Rwandan basket weaver and a Kenyan basket weaver are not in the same competitive position. The tariff schedule recognises this.
EAC Cooperative Export Pooling	Small producers in partner countries pool their export volumes through the EAC Cooperative Export Pool — a regional cooperative of cooperatives. A Burundian coffee cooperative with 500kg of export-ready coffee cannot afford international buyer relationships, logistics, or quality certification. The EAC Export Pool handles all of this collectively, using Kenya's KEPROBA international trade network as the operational backbone. The coffee is sold as Burundian — Kenya merely provides the logistics and buyer relationships.
PAPSS local currency invoicing mandate	All EAC intra-regional trade is invoiced in local currencies through PAPSS from Year 3 of the programme. No USD, no EUR, no correspondent banking premium. A Rwandan exporter invoices in Rwandan Francs. A Kenyan importer pays in Kenyan Shillings. PAPSS handles the conversion at the interbank rate with no markup. The 3–7% correspondent banking cost is eliminated. For a micro-economy exporter, this is a direct 3–7% price improvement without any productivity improvement required.
AfCFTA Adjustment Fund — Kenya's contribution	Kenya commits 0.5% of its annual customs revenue to the AfCFTA Adjustment Fund — the continental structural adjustment instrument for countries experiencing short-term dislocation from trade liberalisation. Kenya's commitment is voluntary but proportional to its position as the largest EAC economy by manufacturing capacity. The Fund is managed by the AfCFTA Secretariat under AU audit oversight.

5.2 Global Trade Positioning — See Section Eight

Kenya's global trade positioning — bilateral relationships with the EU, US, China, India, Gulf states, Japan, and Korea — is addressed in Section Eight (Global Trade Positioning: Individual and Collective), which frames each relationship in the context of both Kenya's individual leverage and the consolidated leverage available through EAC, COMESA, and AU collective engagement. The bilateral relationships are the delivery mechanisms; the regional organisations are the force multipliers.

SECTION SIX

Training and Technical Cooperation — Exporting the KNDP

6.1 The Training Cooperation Architecture — All Education Levels

Every institution the KNDP builds generates expertise that does not exist elsewhere in East Africa. The KRCC Academy, the KSBC Academy, the KRC Training Command, the KNAC Training Institute, the Settlement Maintenance Academy, KAERS, and the KLIC Academy are the tertiary and vocational tier. But the integration vision requires collaboration across every level of education — from early childhood through postgraduate research — because sustainable integration is built on a generation of East Africans who know each other, learn together, and think of the region as their natural operating environment.

Education Level	EAC Collaborative Architecture
Early Childhood — EAC Common Early Childhood Framework	An EAC Early Childhood Development Framework establishes a common curriculum baseline for ages 3–6: numeracy, literacy in mother tongue and Swahili (EAC's official language), basic science observation, and social cooperation. The framework does not replace national curricula — it establishes the minimum common foundation. Children across EAC grow up with a shared foundational language (Swahili) and shared early learning experiences. The EAC Digital Content Library hosts open-source early childhood materials in all EAC languages — free to every school in every member state.
Primary — EAC Comprehensive School Standard and Sister Schools	Kenya's Comprehensive School Standard — pool, theatre, science lab, woodwork, music room — is proposed as the EAC minimum school standard over a 20-year timeline. Immediately: the EAC Sister Schools Programme pairs every Kenyan primary school with a partner primary school in another EAC member state. The pairing is supported by: annual exchange visits for teachers, joint science fair participation through the EAC Digital Platform, shared NEMIS-equivalent data (anonymised) for cross-country learning outcome comparison, and shared digital teaching resources. A child in Kisumu writes to a child in Kigali. A teacher in Mombasa shares a lesson plan with a teacher in Kampala. Integration begins at 8 years old.
Secondary — EAC Baccalaureate and Student Exchange	The EAC Baccalaureate — a common secondary school leaving certificate recognised by all EAC universities for admission purposes — is proposed as the medium-term (Year 10) harmonisation target. Immediately: the EAC Student Exchange Programme sends 500 secondary school students per year (50 per member state, 50 per host member state) on one-term exchanges. Students attend school in a partner country, live with host families, and return with a formal EAC Exchange Certificate that counts toward their national qualification. The long-term goal: a Rwandan student applying to the University of Nairobi

Education Level	EAC Collaborative Architecture
	competes on equal terms with a Kenyan student. A Kenyan student applying to Makerere competes on equal terms with a Ugandan student.
Technical and Vocational — EAC KNQF Mutual Recognition	Kenya's KNQF (Kenya National Qualifications Framework) is harmonised with the EAC Qualifications Framework — so that a Level 4 certificate from the KRCC Academy is recognised at Level 4 by Uganda's NCHE, Rwanda's HEC, Tanzania's NACTVET, and all EAC equivalents. A KRCC-trained road builder from Rwanda can work in Kenya and vice versa. A KNAC-trained paramedic from Kenya can work in Uganda. The mutual recognition covers: all KNDP corps academies, all EAC TVET colleges that apply for mutual recognition certification, and all regulated professional qualifications (engineer, nurse, accountant, lawyer). The EAC Qualifications Authority is the mutual recognition body — existing in draft form, needs full capitalisation and legal standing.
University — EAC Research Universities Consortium	The 10 largest research universities in the EAC — University of Nairobi, Makerere University, University of Dar es Salaam, Kigali Institute of Science and Technology, Addis Ababa University, Jimma University, University of Juba, University of Burundi, University of DRC (Kinshasa), and Mogadishu University — form the EAC Research Universities Consortium (EARUC). The Consortium: jointly applies for AfDB and EU Horizon research grants; shares laboratory infrastructure through a booking system (a Ugandan researcher accesses the University of Nairobi's electron microscope three weeks per year under a pre-booked schedule); publishes a joint EAC Research Journal with open-access policy; and runs a joint PhD programme in which doctoral students spend at least one year at a Consortium university other than their home institution.
University — EAC Corporate Academy Network	Kenya's Corporate Academy Ladder — KRCC, KSBC, and KLIC with integrated university pathways validated by JKUAT and Egerton — is extended to EAC partner universities. A Ugandan student who completes the KRCC Academy's HND programme can articulate into Makerere University's Engineering Faculty at second year. Rwanda's University of Rwanda validates the KSBC Academy's BIM programme. The Corporate Academy Network means that a young person who starts as a settlement maintenance technician in Nairobi can end up with an engineering degree that is recognised across EAC — and that the same pathway exists in every EAC member state over a 15-year roll-out.
Postgraduate and Research — EAC Research Agenda	The EARUC jointly defines an EAC Research Agenda — the 20 most important research questions for East Africa's development — and allocates research funding through competitive grants to Consortium members. The Agenda covers: agricultural productivity under climate change, optimal grid architecture for the EAPP, mineral beneficiation technology for EAC critical minerals, water management in shared river basins, urban

Education Level	EAC Collaborative Architecture
	settlement design for East African climate, and the EAC integration process itself (what works, what does not, why). Kenya's KAERS and KLIC contribute their research pipeline to the Agenda. Kenya's universities get international co-authorship. Partner country universities get research funding and facilities access.
Language — Swahili as the EAC Common Academic Language	Swahili is already the EAC's official language and Kenya's national language. The EAC common education framework designates Swahili as the medium of instruction for shared EAC educational content — the EAC Digital Content Library, the EAC Research Journal's summaries, the EAC Baccalaureate examination questions, the EARUC joint PhD programme's thesis submissions — all available in Swahili. This is not an imposition — it is the recognition that Swahili is already the language of East African commerce, culture, and community, and that making it also the language of East African scholarship accelerates integration more than any treaty.

6.2 The Infrastructure Conceptualisation-to-Completion Partnership

The most sophisticated form of technical cooperation is not training individual workers — it is building the institutional capacity to conceptualise, finance, design, procure, build, and maintain major infrastructure from end to end. The TTCA's highest-value export is the whole-system partnership: a partner country that wants to build a railway works with Kenya's KRC Corps, NDFICO, KRCC, NIS, and Kenya Energy Tribunal model simultaneously. Kenya provides the full stack. The partner country builds the same institutional capability by doing it.

The Conceptualisation-to-Completion Partnership — What It Means

Year 1: Kenya and a partner country identify a major infrastructure project. Kenya's NDFICO prepares the DFI financing assessment. Kenya's relevant corps prepares technical feasibility. Kenya's NIS provides the security environment assessment.

Year 2: The partner country's ministry works alongside Kenya's team to negotiate with DFI partners. Partner country officials learn the sovereign terms doctrine by watching NDFICO apply it — not from a manual.

Years 3–7: The partner country's construction team works alongside Kenya's KRCC or KLIC on the construction. Knowledge transfer is embedded in the work itself.

Year 8 onward: The partner country owns the infrastructure, maintains it with its own trained team, and manages the DFI financing using the documentation templates and monitoring systems Kenya's NDFICO developed for the project.

The institutional legacy: the partner country now has a ministry that can do this again without Kenya's assistance. Kenya has been exported not as a product but as a capability.

SECTION SEVEN

Regional and Continental Organisations — Consolidated Engagement

7.1 The Problem of Fragmented Engagement

East Africa's countries engage with global partners — the World Bank, the IMF, the WTO, the G20, bilateral donor governments, global corporations — individually. A World Bank Country Director in Nairobi negotiates Kenya's Country Partnership Framework. A World Bank Country Director in Kampala negotiates Uganda's independently. A Chinese EXIM official in Beijing receives delegations from Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, and Ethiopia in separate meetings and extracts different terms from each because each negotiates alone. This fragmentation is the single greatest structural weakness of African engagement with global partners. It is not a failure of individual African governments — it is a systemic architecture that benefits those who want to negotiate with Africa one country at a time.

The programme proposes a consolidated engagement architecture — using existing regional organisations as the vehicle for joint negotiation, joint positioning, and joint leverage with global partners.

Regional Organisation	Consolidated Engagement Strategy
East African Community (EAC) — DFI Engagement	The EAC establishes a joint DFI Engagement Secretariat — 10 professionals representing all eight member states — that coordinates all member states' engagement with the World Bank, AfDB, IMF, and major bilateral DFIs. When the World Bank prepares its East Africa Regional Integration DPF (Development Policy Financing), it negotiates with the EAC DFI Secretariat, not with eight individual country teams. The EAC Secretariat establishes pooled financing windows: an EAC Infrastructure Bond (jointly guaranteed by all member states, providing a credit uplift that no individual country achieves alone); an EAC IMF Collective Article IV consultation that presents the region's macroeconomic position as a unit; and an EAC-World Bank Country Partnership Framework that covers the full EAC rather than individual countries. Kenya's NDFICO chairs the EAC DFI Secretariat for the first three years, given its programme development lead.
COMESA — Trade and Investment Collective	Kenya currently holds the COMESA chairmanship alongside the EAC chairmanship. COMESA's 21-country membership (540 million people) is a more powerful WTO negotiating bloc than any individual country. The COMESA Collective Trade Position: a unified COMESA stance at WTO ministerial conferences on: agricultural subsidy disciplines (the US and EU agricultural subsidies distort competition with African smallholders — COMESA negotiates collectively for their reduction); digital trade rules (ensuring that AfCFTA's Digital Trade Protocol is compatible with and reinforced by WTO digital trade rules); and services liberalisation (professional qualifications mutual

Regional Organisation	Consolidated Engagement Strategy
	recognition across COMESA, enabling the free movement of COMESA professionals that the common market protocol promises). Kenya chairs the COMESA Trade Ministers' Collective Negotiating Committee during its chairmanship year.
African Union — Global Partner Engagement	The AU's Department of Economic Development, Trade, Industry and Mining (ETIM) is the institutional vehicle for AU-level engagement with global economic partners. Kenya's President William Ruto is the AU Champion on Institutional Reform — the most senior AU reform mandate currently held by any African head of state. The programme uses this platform to propose: an AU Collective DFI Strategy (all 54 AU member states presenting a unified pipeline of bankable projects to global DFIs, negotiating pool terms that no individual country achieves); an AU-WTO Trade Facilitation Fund (capitalised by G20 contributions, disbursed by the AfCFTA Secretariat for trade facilitation infrastructure); and an AU Climate Finance Collective (presenting Africa's adaptation finance needs as a single continental demand, rather than 54 individual country requests that global climate funds pick through).
IGAD — Horn of Africa Security and Development	The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) — Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Djibouti, Uganda, Eritrea — is East Africa's security-focused regional organisation. For Kenya's programme, IGAD is the vehicle for: cross-border water management (the Nile Basin Initiative, the Tana-Athi-Dawa cross-border catchments, the Turkana aquifer shared with Ethiopia); pastoralist cross-border movement frameworks (essential for Kenya's ASAL corridors and the KRC northern routes); and the Mandera Triangle security cooperation (Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia — the most complex security environment on the LAPSSET corridor). IGAD's development programme is underfunded and underpowered — Kenya proposes an IGAD Development Finance Window capitalised by member states and DFI partners, specifically for cross-border infrastructure.
SADC interface — through Tanzania	Tanzania is a member of both EAC and SADC (Southern African Development Community). Tanzania's railway connection to Kenya's Southern Spine creates a de facto EAC-SADC infrastructure link. Kenya's programme uses Tanzania as the bridge: the EASGR's Southern Spine terminus at Isibania connects to Tanzania's standard gauge network, which connects to SADC's SAPP (Southern African Power Pool) and the SADC railway network. Kenya proposes a formal EAC-SADC Infrastructure Interface Agreement — coordinating the two blocs' railway gauge standards, power pool protocols, and transit documentation systems so that freight from Mombasa to Johannesburg moves on a single bill of lading through a seamless continental system.
G20 and the Africa	The G20 has three African members (South Africa, Egypt, and

Regional Organisation	Consolidated Engagement Strategy
caucus — speaking collectively	Nigeria with observer status, plus the AU as permanent member from 2023). Kenya is not a G20 member but attends as an invitee. The programme proposes that the AU's three G20 members coordinate an Africa caucus position at every G20 summit — presenting Africa's collective priorities on: debt restructuring (the G20 Common Framework for Debt Treatments has been too slow and too limited), climate finance (the $100B Copenhagen commitment remains unmet), and development finance reform (MDB capital adequacy rules should be reformed to allow greater leverage). Kenya drafts the Africa caucus position papers during Ruto's AU Institutional Reform chairmanship, building the analytical capacity that gives Africa a unified, technically credible voice at the G20.
China Belt and Road Initiative — collective renegotiation	China's BRI has lent extensively across EAC — Kenya (SGR), Tanzania (SGR), Ethiopia (Addis-Djibouti railway), Uganda (pending). In every case, the lending terms were negotiated bilaterally, with operational control clauses, foreign-law provisions, and limited transparency. The programme proposes an EAC BRI Renegotiation Framework — all EAC member states with BRI-financed infrastructure agree to present a unified renegotiation position to China: Kenyan governing law for all BRI infrastructure agreements in EAC; EAC-hosted dispute resolution (using the EAC Court of Justice); no operational control clauses; full tariff transparency within 48 hours. The collective leverage: China cannot afford to lose the entire EAC market for BRI. Individual countries can be picked off one by one. The EAC collective cannot.

SECTION EIGHT

Global Trade Positioning — Individual and Collective

8.1 Kenya's Individual Global Positioning

Kenya's individual global trade relationships are the subject of the bilateral diplomacy in Section 2. What is new here is the framing: Kenya engages bilaterally where bilateral leverage is greater than collective leverage — specifically in relationships where Kenya's individual KNDP programme is the asset (the KRC corridor, the KISC industrial opportunity, the KECA energy contract platform). Kenya engages collectively — through EAC, COMESA, or AU — where collective leverage is greater — specifically in relationships with global giants (World Bank, IMF, WTO, China BRI, G20) where Africa's fragmentation has historically been exploited.

Global Partner	Individual vs Collective Approach
European Union — EPA renegotiation	INDIVIDUAL: Kenya renegotiates its EPA bilaterally to add processed goods to the zero-tariff schedule. Kenya's leverage: the EU values the Kenya relationship and Kenya's programme is a credible development story. COLLECTIVE: The EAC collectively negotiates an EAC-EU Economic Partnership Agreement that replaces the current patchwork of individual EPAs. The EAC-EU EPA covers all eight member states under common terms — giving smaller EAC members EU market access they cannot negotiate alone.
United States — post-AGOA bilateral framework	INDIVIDUAL: Kenya negotiates a bilateral US-Kenya Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA+) that covers goods, services, digital trade, and infrastructure investment — more comprehensive than AGOA's narrow goods focus. Kenya is the United States' most important partner in East Africa and negotiates accordingly. COLLECTIVE: The EAC collectively engages the US on AGOA successor arrangements — presenting the EAC as a single market and asking for EAC-wide preferential access rather than country-by-country treatment.
China — BRI renegotiation and trade balance	INDIVIDUAL: Kenya renegotiates the SGR BRI terms on the KRC Act no-operational-control basis. Kenya presents its NDFICO portfolio as an alternative financing architecture that reduces dependence on any single bilateral partner. COLLECTIVE: EAC BRI Renegotiation Framework (described in Section 7.1) — Kenya leads the collective position but all EAC members benefit.
World Bank, IMF, AfDB	COLLECTIVE (primary): EAC DFI Engagement Secretariat negotiates programmatic facilities for the EAC as a unit. Individual country CPFs align to the regional framework. INDIVIDUAL (secondary): Kenya's NDFICO maintains bilateral relationships with each IFI's Kenya desk — the individual relationship is the delivery mechanism for the collectively negotiated framework.

Global Partner	Individual vs Collective Approach
Gulf states — individual and collective	INDIVIDUAL: Kenya's relationship with Gulf SWFs (PIF, ADQ, QIA) for KRC co-investment and KISC strategic partnership is bilateral — Kenya's specific opportunity, Kenya's specific infrastructure. COLLECTIVE: The EAC Sovereign Wealth Fund Engagement Platform — coordinated by the EAC DFI Secretariat — presents the full EAC infrastructure pipeline to Gulf SWFs annually. A Gulf SWF that invests in Kenya's KRC is introduced to Uganda's Karuma Dam upgrade, Rwanda's Kigali logistics hub, and Tanzania's Dar es Salaam port expansion as the next investment in the same regional portfolio.
Japan and Korea — technology transfer	INDIVIDUAL: Kenya's relationship with JICA (HVDC co-financier) and KOICA/POSCO (KISC technology partner) is bilateral and project-specific. COLLECTIVE: The EARUC (EAC Research Universities Consortium) engages Japan's JSPS and Korea's NRF for joint research funding — the Consortium's collective research capacity is more attractive to Japanese and Korean science funders than any individual university.

SECTION NINE

Financing the Programme Diplomatically

9.1 The Portfolio Approach to DFI Financing

The Fedha ya Taifa document sets out the per-project DFI matrix — specific instruments for specific investments. The Diplomasia ya Taifa document explains how Kenya reaches the DFI partners to execute these transactions. The two documents are complementary. Fedha sets the terms. Diplomasia delivers the partners.

DFI Access Strategy	Diplomatic Action Required
Chinese EXIM/CDB — $5.0B KRC tranche	The no-operational-control doctrine must be negotiated at the highest diplomatic level — President to President. Chinese policy banks have operational control clauses in standard contracts because previous borrowers accepted them. Kenya's position: we present this as a bilateral relationship issue, not a technical one. The clause does not appear in the KRC Corps Act. It cannot appear in the financing agreement. The negotiating leverage: Kenya is building the corridor that connects East Africa to Mombasa port, which handles a significant portion of Chinese goods destined for East Africa. China's commercial interest in the corridor's completion is as large as Kenya's.
Gulf SWF — $2.5B KRC tranche + KISC partnership	The Gulf relationship is activated through the Head of State channel — President to Crown Prince. The pitch: Kenya is building the logistics corridor that connects East Africa's fastest-growing consumer market to Gulf maritime trade routes. The Isiolo Inland Depot and Lamu Port are the East African equivalent of Jebel Ali. Gulf SWFs invest in port logistics globally — Lamu is the opportunity they do not yet have in East Africa. The KISC 25% strategic partner slot is separately offered — first to Gulf industrial groups (Saudi Aramco's downstream diversification, UAE industrial policy) before the Korean/German technology partner decision is made.
AfDB — multiple facilities	AfDB's Country Director for Kenya is an NDFICO standing meeting — monthly, not project-by-project. The KNDP is presented as a single coherent programme with 22 AfDB-relevant facilities. AfDB's approval process is accelerated when a country presents a programmatic framework rather than individual projects — Kenya is the first EAC country to do so at this scale. AfDB's internal advocates for Kenya's programme are cultivated through the TTCA — AfDB staff who have seen the KRCC Academy or the KNAC Training Institute in operation become programme advocates in AfDB's internal approval processes.
World Bank — IDA and IBRD	The World Bank Country Partnership Framework for Kenya is renegotiated at the programme level. Kenya presents the KNDP as

DFI Access Strategy	Diplomatic Action Required
	the national development strategy (IDA requirement) and requests that the CPF align its IDA allocations to the KNDP's priorities. The KNDP's fiscal consolidation trajectory — deficit from 5.6% to 4.3% — meets the IMF programme conditions that the World Bank uses to determine IDA access. Kenya's programme is the argument for maximum IDA allocation.
EIB and bilateral Europe	The EIB's infrastructure mandate is activated through the EU-Kenya EPA renegotiation — the EU's development finance instrument (EIB) follows the EU's trade policy. Germany's KfW is activated through the bilateral development cooperation framework — Kenya proposes a 10-year KfW partnership programme covering water infrastructure, settlement maintenance, and renewable energy. France's AFD is activated through the KRC Training Command partnership (SNCF-AFD jointly finance the Training Command operational phase). Nordic bilateral partners are activated through the Mazingira programme's water tower restoration and bamboo boundary — these are the project categories that Nordic ODA prioritises.
Bond markets — domestic and international	The Kenya Railway Infrastructure Bond (domestic, KES-denominated, 15-year, 7.5%) is launched through the NSE with NDFICO managing the roadshow. The KRC International Bond (USD-denominated, 20-year, sovereign guarantee) is launched through the international bond market with a lead manager selected through competitive tender. The NHB Diaspora Bond is launched through the eCitizen portal — every Kenyan in the diaspora with a national ID and a USD 500 minimum investment can participate. The bond roadshow is not just financial — it is diplomatic. Every bond investor is also a stakeholder in Kenya's success.

SECTION TEN

The Twenty-Year Diplomatic Trajectory

10.1 Year by Year

Phase	Diplomatic Milestones
Year 1 (Programme Launch)	KRC Corps Act enacts the no-operational-control clause in statute. Chinese EXIM negotiations begin at Presidential level. Gulf SWF roadshow for KRC co-investment and KISC strategic partner slot. NDFICO established and staffed. MFA Economic Diplomacy Directorate restructured. TTCA established. PAPSS full commercial bank integration in Kenya launched. Kenya-EAC bilateral Rules of Origin fast-track agreements with Uganda, Rwanda, and Tanzania signed.
Year 2	Chinese EXIM $5.0B KRC financing agreement signed — no operational control. Gulf SWF $2.5B co-investment agreement signed. KISC strategic technology partner (Korean or German) selected and agreement signed. EAC Niche Product Register operational. AfDB CPF renegotiated at programme level. TTCA first EAC training cohorts at KRCC Academy, KSBC Academy, KNAC Training Institute.
Years 3–5	KRC Phase 1 (Southern Spine, Lateral Spine) construction begins. EASGR Ugandan and Tanzanian connections in negotiation. East African Power Pool Kenya export agreement signed with Uganda. EAC Digital Single Market launched. KEPROBA restructured and EAC trade promotion active. NHB Diaspora Bond issued — first tranche.
Years 6–8	KRC Phase 1 freight revenue commences — debt service coverage 1.0×. KISC Year 7 first heat — domestic steel production begins. Rail Autonomy Threshold: all technical KRC roles Kenyan. EASGR five-country network operational. EAC Industrial Complementarity Map published annually. Kenya's PAYE revenue from KNDP institutions: Ksh 100–140B/year — the programme pays for itself.
Years 10–15	EAC Monetary Union negotiations at advanced stage. AfCFTA Rules of Origin fully resolved across all EAC states. PAPSS continental: all 54 AU member states, all commercial banks. African Infrastructure Investment Bank established and making first investments. TTCA has trained 10,000+ EAC partner country nationals across all corps programmes. Kenya's debt-to-GDP declining toward 55%.
Years 15–20	EAC Political Confederation formally operational — shared institutions, common external representation at WTO and IMF. African Federal Assembly constitutional framework ratified by 38+ AU states. EASGR nine-country network complete or in final phase. Kenya is the logistics, industrial, and digital hub of East Africa — not by design but by the consequence of having built the infrastructure first. Kenya's debt-to-GDP approaching 42% — the programme that

Phase	Diplomatic Milestones
	was financed has financed its own retirement.

10.2 The Closing Argument

Kenya borrows at 67.8% of GDP. The IMF threshold is 50%. The gap is real and the risk is genuine. But the countries that have escaped this trap did not do so by spending less. They did so by spending better — investing in institutions that generated fiscal returns greater than the cost of the debt.

Korea's debt-to-GDP ratio in 1960 was 80%. Korea built POSCO. Korea built Hyundai. Korea built the Saemangeum reclamation. Korea built institutions that generated returns that retired the debt and made Korea a high-income country in a single generation. Kenya is not Korea. But the logic is identical. The programme must be bold enough to work or it is not worth the debt it incurs.

The foreign affairs vision serves this logic. It secures the financing on sovereign terms. It builds the regional infrastructure that multiplies Kenya's returns. It creates the continental market that Kenya's KISC, KFPEC, and agricultural processing industries need. It exports Kenya's institutional capability in a form that builds Africa rather than depleting it.

Kenya's diplomacy, conducted on these terms, is the foreign policy expression of the same doctrine that animates the entire programme: that the state's role is not to manage decline but to architect transformation. Umoja ni nguvu. Afrika ni nyumba yetu. Tunajenga pamoja.

DIPLOMASIA YA TAIFA — Kenya National Foreign Affairs and Integration Vision. *Kenya National Development Programme.*

This document forms part of the Kenya National Development Programme and should be read alongside Fedha ya Taifa (Finance), Mpango wa Taifa (Programme Synthesis), Ujenzi na Miundombinu (Infrastructure), and all sector documents referenced herein. The KRC Atlas, the NDFICO architecture, the PAPSS integration, and the AfCFTA engagement described here are not aspirational — they are the diplomatic programme required to deliver what every other KNDP document has specified.

PROGRAMME INTEGRATION APPENDIX

Diplomasia ya Taifa — Foreign Affairs — Cross-Programme Integration, Employment Summary and Legal Register

---

A. Employment Summary

Institution / Role	Permanent	Entry-Level	Entry Qualification and Pathway
Ministry of Foreign Affairs diplomatic staff (programme-enabled expansion)	800	200	Diplomatic officers, trade attaches, EAC integration officers — KNQF Level 6–7.
EAC One-Stop Border Post officers	600	600	ALL new positions. Border management officers at expanded OSBPs — KNQF Level 4.
Kenya Trade and Investment Authority staff (expanded)	300	100	Trade facilitation officers, investment promotion — KNQF Level 6.

Employment Summary	Figure
Total permanent positions (Year 10 steady state)	~1,700
Entry-level positions (KNQF Level 2–5)	~900
Reference — full programme employment register	Programme Integration Index (PII) Section Two

B. Cross-Programme Linkages

Every linkage below names the specific institution, data system, or instrument that creates the interface. Vague references are not listed — only confirmed operational connections.

Links To	Specific Linkage — Institution, Data System, or Instrument at the Interface
Nishati ya Taifa	EAC power pool: KECA-approved export pricing agreements published within 48 hours. EASGR transmission corridor. Power export revenue (Ksh 156B/year by Year 10) is one of the programme's largest new revenue streams. Kenya's energy surplus is Diplomasia's most important regional leverage.
Usafiri wa Taifa	EAC single customs territory: OSBP at all major crossings, 4-hour commercial freight crossing target, EAC Border Management System. Mombasa and Lamu ports as EAC's primary ocean gateways — Diplomasia negotiates the EAC port access agreements that determine how Kenya's port infrastructure is shared with landlocked EAC partners.
Sayansi na Teknolojia	EARUC (EAC Research Universities Consortium): Diplomasia establishes the EAC framework, Sayansi operationalises Kenya's participation. Malindi Space Centre designated as EAC regional space facility — Diplomasia negotiates the EAC Space Programme treaty (collectively funded small constellation of earth observation satellites). KAIST-K accepts EAC student quota on EAC scholarship terms.
Ulinzi na Usalama	KMEC as preferred Kenyan bidder for EAC connectivity projects:

	Taveta-Moshi bridge, Moyale border infrastructure, EAC road corridor improvements. Diplomasia negotiates the EAC infrastructure co-financing frameworks that make KMEC's EAC cross-border mandate financially viable. Border management security coordination with EAC security services.
Mifugo na Uvuvi	EAC Maritime Fisheries Zone: joint Kenya-Tanzania-Uganda management. Diplomasia negotiates the EAC Fisheries Treaty that gives KMFRI joint research authority across the zone. Kenya Shipyards vessels may serve EAC partners under ship-leasing agreements.
Chakula na Lishe	EAC food reserve sharing protocol: when Kenya reaches KFSEWS Alert or Emergency level, EAC partners with surplus activate a food transfer agreement. Reciprocally, Kenya releases to EAC partners in deficit. Diplomasia negotiates and maintains the EAC Food Reserve Agreement that makes this automatic rather than discretionary.

C. Legal Instruments and Constitutional Protection

Legal Instrument	Year	Pathway
EAC Customs Union Amendment — Kenya ratification of enhanced single customs territory provisions	Year 2	Parliamentary ratification (simple majority) of EAC treaty instrument
EAC Free Movement of Persons Protocol — Kenya ratification, EAC Biometric ID Card	Year 2	Parliamentary ratification
EAC Space Programme Treaty — Kenya as host state for Malindi regional facility	Year 3	Parliamentary ratification
African Continental Free Trade Area — Kenya domestic implementation legislation	Year 2	Simple majority

D. Live Metrics and Accountability

Full cross-reference detail: Programme Integration Index (PII) — Sections 1, 2, and 3.
Live metrics: EAC Integration Dashboard. Monthly: EAC border crossing times (target 4 hours for commercial freight), EAC power export volume and revenue, Malindi Space Centre commercial tracking contracts. Annual: EAC integration scorecard (20 domains), Kenya trade balance with EAC partners, diaspora remittances vs programme investment ratio.